ijJBRARY OF CONGRESS. | 
/ 77Z I 

OF 7VMERICA. ^^ 






UNITED STATES 



FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



"Witli firnmess in the right, as God gives ns to see the right." — Abraham lAncoliu 



FIAT JXJSTITIA. 



SPEECH 



HON. JOSEPH WHEELER, 



OF -a.il.aba.m:a. 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



TnuESDAY, February 15, 1883. 



WASHINGTON. 
1883. 



^^'% 



SPEECH 



HON. JOSEPH WHEELER, 



The House havini^ under consideration the bill (S. 1844) for the relief of Fitz- 
•John Porter — 

Mr. WHEELER said: 

Mr. Speaker: As regards thecoudiict of man to mau, the highest 
command given is that he do unto others even as he would that 
others should do unto him ; and when wrong is done to any man it 
should be restored to him twofold. 

If this mandate should be observed by men, how imperatively 
shoitld it be the law to govern sovereignties of men ! And if repara- 
tion must be made to all men, by what rules of measurement should 
a nation make restitution for the wrongs inflicted upon a public serv- 
ant whose patriotic, faithful, and heroic service has given luster to 
lier military renown ? 

General Porter does not ask that the Scriptural precept be meted 
to him — that to him should be restored twofold for the wrong that 
lias been done him. The demand for j ustice does not come from him ; 
it comes from the people. Let me express myself clearly. I do not 
rise, Mr. Speaker, to make an appeal for Fitz-John Porter. That he 
has been the victim of wrong, great wrong, has been iucontrovertibly 
proven to the Auu^rican people. He has suffered, and his family has 
shared his cup of bitterness. Yes, Mr. Speaker, for the fifth of a cent- 
ury the pangs of a living death have been their portion, but his 
grandeur of character, sustained by Chi istian virtue, has proved equal 
to the emergency. 

What he now endures, what he has borne for twentj'^ years, he can 
still support for the short term God may will that he remain with us; 
and then the grass, perchance rose-bedecked, may grow over a grave 
marked by a broken shaft on which will be engraved only the words 



FITZ-JOHN POKTKK. 

Passion, prejudice, aucl falsebood may poiHOii the first impressions 
of the most earnest seeker for truth, but the sober second thought of 
the American people will always crystallize around right and justice. 
The fabric of injustice which the enemies of this great soldier have 
reared by suppression of facts and distortion of truth will prove fu- 
tile to withstand the evidence which, accumulatiug day by day, will, 
like the steady current of the Mississippi or the thundering torrents 
of Niagara, sweep every vestige of their work, and themselves with 
it, into the ocean of oblivion. My appeal, Mr. Speaker, is for the 
honor of our country; that so far as lies in our power we avert the 
stigma which must inevitably rest upou her escutcheon should we 
refuse or hesitate in the rectification of this great wrong. 

THE PEOPLE HAVE VINDICATED GENERAL POUTEK. 

The honor of Fitz-John Porter is no longer in your hands. In their 
own high court the American people have reversed the decision of 
1B63. We now call upon you to register the popular decree. 

Individual considerations are lost in the presence of the more stu- 
pendous question of principle which we feel should guide this great 
nation in its dealing with its servants. 

rOKTEU DELIBERATELY SELECTED FOR IMMOLATION. 

The subject we are called to discuss leads us to make this inquiry : 

Is the life, or, what is dearer than life, is the honor of an officer 
safe in times of great public excitement when his destruction will 
aid the purposes of partisans ? 

In a country where there is so much virtue and intelligence and love of 
justice we would readily conclude that generally Americans, Avhether 
officers or citizens, might depend upon being awarded justice in our 
courts, either civil or military, but the evidence presented by this 
case to the House and the investigation of other similar cases are 
startling reminders that we cannot always depend upon the truth or 
certainty of this proposition. 

Fitz-Johu Porter — the brave soldier — the beau ideal of chivalry — 
^.he only member of his class who won on the plains of Mexico 
the brevet of a field officer— the man selected to instill honor and 
chivalry into the minds of the military students of our country — 
the Chevalier Bayard of the Army of the Potomac — the man who, 



•ulready covered with glory ou twenty fields of battle, was selected 
to command McClellan's rear-guard from June 26, 1862, the darkest 
hours seen by the 100,000 men that the gallant and skillful McClel- 
lau had pressed to the very inner gates of the confederate capital — 
Fitz-Johu Porter, the man who in those desponding hours rallied 
^nd aligned the dispirited troops, and owing to whose skill and cour- 
age the sun went down the night of July 1 upon the triumph of 
Malvern Hill, a victory so brilliant and so signallj'due tothat officer 
as to call for the thanks of the nation, this is the man deliberately se- 
lected for immolation ! The disaster to Pope's army, which occurred 
within sixty days from this victory at Malvern Hill, required a scape- 
..goat and a sacrifice. 

Fitz- John Porter had refused or had failed to assist in fomenting 
unjust accusations against General Patterson, and had thereby in- 
curred the ill-will of that officer's enemies. He had sijoken highly 
of McClellan and Buell, and it was charged that he had used ex- 
pressions which could be interpreted as indicating that the officer 
who escorted President Lincoln while en route to Washington, and 
who was then commanding fiftj'^ thousand men in the defense of the 
national capital, was not endowed with all the attributes of agrea 
commander. 

These offenses, together with assertions (devoid of foundation) that 
in private conversation he had used utterances which indicated that 
he did not approve certain views that the Administration regarded 
favorably, added force to the incentive to charge General Fitz- John 
Porter with cowardice before the enemy; and a specification of tar- 
diness was sufficient in that time of great excitement to cause the 
court, without a scintilla of credible evidence, to brand that awful 
word upon the name of a distinguished Americ-an general whose in- 
trepidity and courage were winning from his soldiers the soubriquet 
of the Marshal Ney of the American continent. 

When a man in the high places of military power needs a victim, 
one can be found. Pope needed a victim, and he found one. I do 
believe that if such a towering military genius as Alexander, or Han- 
nibal, or Caesar, or Marlborough, or Napoleon, or if any one who com- 
bined the high qualities of all these in one, had been the exciting 
cause of overshadowing the self-supposed glory and eminence of John 



Topt', that, as the situation tben existed, lie could have found his 
victim even in such an illustrious personage. Not only would he 
have found his victim, but he could have found a court subservient 
to his )iurpo8es, and -witnesses quick and apt with the testimony 
necessary to convict him. 

801:tU1«)XS have a KIGHT to FEKL ANU Sl'KAK ON THIS SUBJECT. 

The taunts so often hurled at men from a certaiu section of the 
United States, who, in compliance with oflicial obligations, presume 
to express the results of their investigations and reflections on this 
subject, will not drive us from our duty. 

In rt-ply to their question as to what ire bave to do with it, let rae 
say that in legislation of a judicial nature we strive to act witliout 
passion or bias; and I desire to say that the honor of an American 
soldier is as dear to us as it is to tlie people of any portion of our 
land, whether he belong to one section of the Union or the other. 

I shall endeavor to confine myself to a discussion of the subject in 
a military and historical view, as my friend fronr Wisconsin, the 
able jurist, General Bkagg, informs me he will give especial consid- 
eration to the legal aspects of the case. 

SUCCESS THE END OF MILITARY OPEllATIOXS. 

There is but one purjjose in conducting military operations; and 
that is, to attain success. 

Decided victory at one point of battle will often determine the re- 
sult, and where the armies are about equal in strength, morale, and 
position, this is so generally true that it is received as a recognized 
axiom of war. 

Victory at a point of battle is attained by accumulating a predomi- 
nance of force at a given place. 

This involves many elements; but supposing other things to be 
equal the problem restdves itself into the concentration of men at 
the point indicated, alluf which is modified by the various elements 
which enter into warfare, such as strength of position, morale of com- 
batants, resolution, ability, and vigorof attack ; determination, skill, 
and stubbornness of defense. 

Now, in order to tight with the necessary elements of advantage^ 
we must know substantially and inactically the strength and posi- 
tion of the army we propose to assail. 



The conimandinc; general canuot be e\'erywliere, and cannot know 
the continnally cliiiii<i,iiig condition of the op]>i)8iug army. 

To act with intelligence his army is divided into corns, each of 
which is nnder the orders of a m;in who is and onght to be eqnal in 
many respects to the army commander. 

He is a man whose repntatitn and renown is national. 

While he is i)rinuiril3' responsible to his commander, he is also re- 
sponsible to the coiDitry and to the government he has sworn to serve. 

Such chief of corps has not performed his dnty unless he has kept 
himself fully advised regarding the enemy, which information he 
should transmit frequently and rapidly to the general of the army. 

All orders he n^ceives should be obeyed with promptness and intel- 
ligence, and. an 

INTELLIGENT CliEDIENCE OF OlilJEUS 

comprehends an obedience Avhich will carry out the purposes of the 
connnanding general. 

A literal comfiHance with an order which it is evident would defeat 
the designs of the general, and which it is evident was written with 
erroneous imprexsion regarding the situation, would be base and crim- 
inal disobedience. 

To win battles you do not want subordinates who with the acu- 
men of a lawyer will justify blunders and unskillful manceus'ers by 
strained, critical construction of words or phrases. 

Victories are attained by simpler principles than these. 

Every corps commai der knows the position of tlie enemy's troops. 
He knows the general plan of battle; he knows the point of attack 
proposed for the other corps; he knows the general principles which 
govern operations on the field, and the oliticer who keeps these views 
uppermost in his mind will generally construe orders as his com- 
mander intended he should. 

If a chief of corps receives a written order which he knows to be 
based upon a status which han changed, iiud he knows that compli- 
ance with it will cause useless slaughter to his men and insure dis- 
aster, can any one justify the officer who blindly and like an au- 
tomaton nnchanically obeys the literal direction ? 

I say emphatically, no ! and military history for two thousand years 
sustains me in my assertion. 



So, too, if auy order has been 

DELAYED IN TUAXSMISSIOX, 

80 that wheu received the time has ptuisedfor subserving the intended pur- 
pose, the same discretion should be used, and fiiilare to use it would 
be base and criminal. 

I not only admit but I must insist that any non-compliance with 
orders in battle is at the peril of the officer who assumes so grave a 
responsibility. 

If by neglect of his duty he has failed to inform himself suffi- 
ciently of the situation, that subsequent events show his action was 
not in all respects proper', he is and ought to be hold to the highest 
responsibility. 

So, too, if his mental comprehension is so weak or o))tuse that he 
can not instantly discern his duty, he is not the man designed by- 
nature for a valuable tactician at the supreme moment of battle. 

It may be said by some that this test is too severe, but the friends 
of Fitz-John Porter ask no relaxation of its stringency. As the re- 
ward of the successful chieftain is imperishable renown, they admit 
that the country has a right to correspondingly exacting require- 
ments. But still that 

MODEUN GOD OF WAR, NAl'OLEON, 

made no such rules for his marshals and generals. 

If literal compliance with the words of his orders had been in- 
variably followed, history would now record disastrous defeats in 
place of many of the brilliant victories which have entwined imper- 
ishable renown with the name of that greatest of commanders. 

Such a rule would have made the exercise of two of his most valued 
maxims of war impracticable, nugatory, and impossible. 

FIRST. 

There is a moment in battles when the smallest manrenveror the smallest num- 
ber of troops decides and gives the superiority. 

SECOND. 

In war, as in politics, the lost moment never returns, rortune is a woman, and 
it is necessary to profit boldly by every opportunity. 

I read these two maxims of Napoleon from the very excellent work 

of Edward Yates, B. A., of King's College, London, page 38. The 

work is specially commended ."iiul indorsed by Professor Narrien, of 



9 

the Royal Military College, and also by Lieutenaut-Geueral Sir \Vm. 
Ifapier, K. C. B. 

I will now read from Baron de Jomini, page 70, on this subject of 

THE FUNDAMENTAL PIUNC1PLF.6 OF WAU : 

It is proposed to show that there is oue grtat principle underlyiDg ail the opera- 
tions of war, a principle which must he followed in all good comhinations. It is 
embraced in the following njaxims : 

I. 
To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the 
decisive points of a theater of war, and iilso upon the communications of the 
enemy, as much as possible, without compromising one's own. 

II. 
To manceuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's 

forces. 

III. 

On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or 
upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to over 
throw. 

IV. 

To 80 arrange that these masses shall not only bo thrown upon the decisive point, 
hut that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy. 

From Military Maxims of Napoleon, as translated by Colonel 
D'Aguilar, adjutant general to the troops serving in Ireland, the 
seventy-second maxim is: 

A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under cover of 
his sovereign or of a minister when these are both distant from the scene of oper- 
ation, and must conseijueutly be either ill-informed or wholly ignorant of the act- 
ual state of things. 

Hence it ftdlows that every general is culpable who undertakes the execution of 
apian which he considers faulr.y. It is his duty to represent his reasons, to insist 
upon a change of p'an, in short, to give in his resignation rather than allow him- 
self to be made the instrument of his army's ruin. Every general-in-chief who 
fights a battle in consequence of superior orders with the certainty of lomng it 
is equally blamal)le. 

In this hist-ineiitioued case the general ought to refuse obedl'-nce, because a blind 
obedience is due only to a niilitaiy command given by a superior present on the spot 
at the moment of action. Being in possession of the real state of things, the 
superior has it then in his power to atfonl the necessary explanations to the per- 
son who executes his orders. But supposing a general-in-chief to receive a posi- 
tive order from his soven-ign, directing him to fight a U ttle, with the further in- 
junction to yield to his adversary and allow himself to be defeated, ought he to 
obey it? No. If the general should be able to comprehend the meaning or utility 
■of such an order, he siiouM execute it, otherwise he should refuse to obey it* 

*Iu the campaign of 1697 Prince Eugtne caused the courier to be intercepted 
■wlio was bringing him orders from the Emperor forbidding him to hazard a battle, 
for which ever\ thing hail been prepared and which he fore^aw would prove de- 
cisive. Heonsiilered, theri-f iie, that he did liis duty in evading the orders of his 
.sov4-reign ; and llie victory of Zanta. in which the Turks lost about thirty thou- 
siind men anil four thoijsand prisoners, rewarded his audaciti'. 



^10 

In 1793 General Hocho, havins recpived orders to move iipnn Treves with an 
army hiirassed by constant jiiarches in a moiintaiiiom and ditlicult country, re- 
fused to obey. Hm observed, wllli reason, that, in order to ■d>tain possi'ssiou of an 
nuimpoitant fortrcs-', then loere exposing his army to inenitahle ruin. He caused, 
thertrori', his troops to return into winter-tpiartera, t\.\\A prefer red the prener'vation 
of his army, upon wliich the success of the future campaign depended, to liis own 
safety. 

Another quotation from an American edition of this work reads : 

A militiry order exacts passive obedience only when it in given by a miperior who 
isipresent on he spot at the moment when hegioes it. Having then knowlcd^ri- nf the 
state of thin^is, he cau listen to the objections and give the necessary explanations, 
to hiiu who should execute the order. 

The maxim which eiijoiu.s tis to 

ATTACIC THE WEAKIiST TOINT 

of the enemy's position is much older than Napoleon. It is as ohl as 
the miUtiiry ;irt itself. At least, we can say it was known and practiced 
at the siege of Troy, as is proven by the fi)liowiiig passages from the 
grand old Homer, to whom we are imlebted for nearly all the mili- 
tary maxims of this and past ages. We perceive herein that not 
only did the Greeks attack the weak point, but also that the Trojans 
had an eye to its defense. The verses below are a part of the ear- 
nest and eloqnent appeal made by Andromache to Hector, urging 
among others this reason why he should remain within the city: 

Here is full work for thy majestic soul, 

For hitbervvaid the waves of battle I'oll; 

Here, by the fig tiees, feeblext is the wall ; 

Heie plant thy stand. ird, here thy heroes call. 

Thrice, heie, the towerini: Greeks their strength have tried; 

Here Ajax stormed wiih Diomede allied, 

Assisted bj' the matchless king of Crete, 

And Atrens' sous, in war-gear clad complete; 

Hither directed, by their skill to see 

Our salient points, or led by pr..phecy, 

I'eihaps some God points out the dangerous way; 

Then heie, dear Hector, di arer husband, stay; 

So that th' AtiidiB and their Grecian braves 

In their next onset, here embrace tlieir graves. 

This maxim was known to Alexander, to Scipio, Hannibal, Ca;sar, 
and Pompey. 

It was known to Marlborough, Wellington, Washington, and Na- 
poleon. 

It was known to Andrew Jackson, and was known to Lee and Grant 
and Sherman and to Fitz-John Porter. 



11 

THK CHAKGES UPON WHICH POUTER WAS TUIED EXAMINED. 

The speciHcations to the charges upon which General Porter wa» 
tried, after divestiug them of verbiage, were, in substance, hese : 

First. Disobedience to the order of August 27th, requirin- him to mar.h from 
Wanenion dun.tion at one o'clock on the niorning of tbe 28ih, aud be at Bnsto» 

Stalioi) bjr da.vliflht. ^ xi • • * 

Second. Disobedience on August 29tb, while in front of the enemy, to tlie joint 

order to McDowell and Port.T, directing them to march toward Gainesville and 

estaWi.-h communication with the other corps. 
IMrd. Disobedience on August 'JOth, whil. in front of the enemy, to what i» 

inownas the " 4.30 p. m. order," requiring Porter to attack the enemy's flank and 



rear. 



His prosecutors of the hist few years have made the additional 
charge that he violated a maxim of war, and, as some term it, one of 
the great leading maxims in Napoleou's military experience. I will 
ehdeavor to discuss these matters in their order, and we will first ex- 
amine 

THE ORDEU DIKECTING POUTER TO START AT 1 A. M., 

on August 28, for Bristoe Station. 

Porter's corps had marched all day. A portion of the troops were 
just going into camp when the order which is referred to aud which 
constitutes the gravamen of the first specification reached him. 
This was at 9.50 p. m. on the 27th. I will read the entire specifica- 
tion : 

Specification IST.-Tn this: that the said Major-General Fitz John Porter, of 
the volunteers of tbe United States, having recen ed a lawful order, on or about 
the -^Tth August, 1862, while at or near Warrenton Juuctio.i, in Virginia, from 
Ma.ior-(>eneral John Pope, his sufierior and commanding officer, in the following 
figures and letteis, to wit : 

Heahquarters Army of Viuginia, 
Augunt 27. 18ti2-G 30 p. m., Bristoe Station. 
Gen-fral- The major-general commanding diiects that you start at one o'clock 
to-ni-l.t aud come forward with your whole corps, or Mi.'h part of it as is witb you, 
so as"to be here by daylight to morrow morning. Hooker has bad a very severc^ac- 
tiou with tlie enemy, wiih a lossof about tb.eehundred killed and wo.inded. The 
enemy has been driven back. Imt is retiriug along tbe railroad. We must drive 
bin. fiom Manassas andclear tbe country between that place and Gainesville, where 
McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you send wor.l t ■ him to push lor« ard im- 
n.ediately ; also send word to Banks to huiry forward witb all speed to take your 
place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that yo.i shoubl be 
here by daylight. I send an officer with thi.* di>patch, who will conduct you to 
th.s place ' Be suie to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, 
piobably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run 



back the railroad tram to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him 
to that effect. 
By command of Major-General Pope : 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General F. J. Porter, Warrenton Jnnction. 

P. S.— Tf Bank.s is not at Wam-nt^n Junction leave arey:iment of infantry and 
two pieces of artillery as a guard till he conies up, with instructions to follnw .\f.u 
immediately. If Banks is not at the junction instruct Colonel Clary to run the 
trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery 
with it. 
By command of ilajor-General Pope: 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
Colonel and Chief of Utaff. 
Did then and there disobey the said order, being at the time in th ■ face of the 
enemy. This at or near Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th 
of August, 1862. 

The distauce was uiiie or tea miles, the uight was dark, and the 
uarrow road, badly cut up with ditches and gullies, was filled with 
the general supply train of the Army. 

[I will have published in the Record a series of maps, illustrating 
the geography of the country and the several positions of the two 
armies.] 

Most of Porter's corps had marched 18 miles a hot summer day, 
and all of them as much as 12 miles. 

Porter had a right to suppose that if Pope knew these facts he 
would not have fixed 1 o'clock for his command to move. He, how- 
ever, directed the order to be complied with, and his subordinate 
generals joined in an appeal that the tired men should be allowed a 
little much-needed sleep. 

Porter immediately sent a dispatch to General Pope stating these 
facts, together with the information that the road was so block- 
aded with wagons that progress would be difficult, suggesting a delay 
until 3 a. m., also respectfully requesting that he would send an officer 
of his stafi' to aid him in moving the wagons out of the road so that he 
could march. 

The fact that General Pope sent officers to aid in clearing the way 
shows that the commanding general recognized the difficulty of Por- 
ter's immediate and literal compliance with the order, by reason of 
the impediments suggested in Porter's retiuest. The conimaiidiug 
general makes haste to aid in thus clearing the way. Porter's request 



13 

for aid to clear the way was but a part of his request to Pope, the 
other ])urt being for two hours'' delay (from 1 to 3 o'clock). Now, the- 
fact that Pope sent officers to aid in clearing the way, thus ac- 
knowledging its necessity, was quite sufficient to assure Porter that 
the general bad recognized the difficulty of an immediate movement. 
This was sufficient to lead Porter to suppose that Pope in complying 
with tlie chief part of the request sigmfied his assent to the other. 
And this suggestion becomes irresistibly forcible when coupled with 
the fatt that uj)on the arrival of Porter the next day the command- 
ing general expressed no displeasure, and that, in fact, if he felt any 
displeasure it was concealed from Porter for nearly three months, he 
hearing nothing of it until the charges were preferred against him.^ 
I do not mean to assert that Porter's letter to General Pope con- 
tained a request, in so many words, for authoiity to delay the march 
until three o'clock. Porter explained the situation to General Pope, 
and stated that therefore (meaning, of course, that unless the com- 
manding general otherwise directed) he would start at three o'clock, 

A COUUIAL AND 60LD1EULY MEETING. 

Not only was there no suggestion of displeasure on the part of Gen- 
eral Pope at this meeting, but there was a remark made by him to 
Porter which conclusively shows that there was no feeling of dis- 
pleasure. He said to Porter that there had heeti no vecebHitij for an 
earlier appearance of his corps. 

Now this meeting of Pope and Porter is extremely significant. Here 
we see the chief and the subordinate /ace/o /ace on themorningof the 
28th. The meetingis cheetful, solditrly, and cordial ; just such a meet- 
ing and greeting as should be between brave men in the harness of war, 
fighting for their country. It must be remembered, too, that both 
these generals had in their minds at that moment the correspondence 
of the previous night; that is, the order to move by Pope, and the 
request of Porter for aid and delay . And with all these transactions 
fresh in the mind of each they vicl on the square; and there is not the 
slightest hint of disapprobation, but, on thec(mirary, the high cour- 
tesies of gentlemen with social and official cordiality. Three months 
afterwards Pope was a witness against Porter on the court-martial. 
In reply to a question from Porter he testities (see p. 19, marginal 



^14 

p. 18, Ex. Doc. No. 71, Thirty-seventh Congress, third session, record 

of Fitz-John Porter's court-martial): 

I siwhini (Portin-) at Bristoo Station. I think it was about 8 o'clock ou tlie 
moniiug of the 28tli. 

And in further reply to most searching interrogatories, General 
Pope saj-8 (see p. 19): 

I am therefore very aiiro that I did not comjrl-.nn to Porter. 

/ am 7iot i^iirethat he gave me any explanation. I have a general recollection that 
lie spoke to me of his march lunl the diflticulties that he had in };etting wayons out 
of the road, * * * and the difficulty he had in getting through the wagon- 
trains. 

Ou page 13 General Pope, in testifying abontthis order, in reply to 
a question from' the judge-advocate, said : 

Q. Did he at thit time, or at auy time before his arrival, explain to you the 
reason why he did not obny the order.<j? 

A. He wrote me a not'-, whii h I received, I think, on the morning of the 28th, 
very early in the m irning, perhaps a little befure daylight. I am not quite sure 
about the time. The note I liave mt>laid. I can give the substance of it. I re- 
member the reasons given by General Porter. 

WAS rOETEE'S REQUEST FOR AID TO KE5I0VE THE IMPEDIMENTS IMrEUTINENT? 

I respectfully submit that there was nothing improper or unusual 
in this request for assistance from the commanding general in their 
removal. 

On the contrary, it was preci-sely what any well-informed and ju- 
dicious otiicer should have done. 

Porter was without anj^ cavalry, and his couriers were exhausted. 
The wagous encumbering the road belonged to the general supply 
trains. 

No portion of the trains which filled the road belonged to Porter's 
corps. , 

For him to give orders to wagon-masters over whom he had no 
control, while proper in case of an exigency when it could not be 
avoided, was certainly more 

COXHISTEXT WITH MIUTAUY RULES 

and discipline for him to prevent dithculty and contlict by asking 
Pope to send an otificer who understood his wishes to superintend this 
work. 
It is very probable that Porter considered it possible there were 



15 

some trains, for instance the animnnition trains, whicb Pope desired 
especially to have hastened on and not turned out of the roau. 

If we establish a principle that it is right and proper for subordi- 
nate commanders to order the supply and ammunition trains of an 
4irmy out of the road, and thus stop them while they are moving pur- 
suant to orders f. om the commanding general, a most dangerous and 
uumilitary system would be inaugurated, and frequently such action 
on the part of subordinate officers would thwart the best-laid plans 
of an army commander; sometimes trains which the general was 
having moved to a place of safety would by orders of a subordinate 
officer'be stopped and left liable to capture, and in other cases sup- 
ply and ammunition trains which were imperatively needed at a 
certain point would by such unauthorized orders be delayed so as to 
materially embarrass the plans of the general commanding. 

4 

GENERAL rOIiTEK WAS TOO GOOD A SOLDIEK 

not to appreciate such considerations, and therefore he asked General 
Pope to have an officer of his staft" who understood his plans present, 
so that by no possibility could he interfere with any wishes or pur- 
poses of the general regarding the movements of the army trains; 
and yet there are men, formerly brave generals, now assailing Gen- 
eral Porter, who sound such deep depths in search of matters of accu- 
sation that they lose their bearings, and in discussing this action of 
Porter regarding the wagons go so fVir as to say that Pope would 
have been justitied in relieving him of his command at that moment. 

This effort to show that in a military sense this request was a piece 
of impertinence amounting to insubordination is a huge absurdity. 
The fact that General Pope complied with it by sending officers to 
aid in clearing the way is conclusive to show that General Pope did 
not consider this request as at all impertinent. A commanding gen- 
eral will hardly make haste to comply with an insulting or imperti- 
nent request. 

Every experienced officer knows how fatiguing is a march over 
a gullied road stopped up with wagons, and that to awaken wearied 
troops in time to start on the march at 1 o'clock will unfit them for 
the next day's work. General Porter knew that upon his arrival at 
Eristoe Station he was 



^16 

KXl'HCTKli TO I'lKSUE A FLYING KNEMY, 

and tbathis coininaudei'.s purposes could be better carried out by al- 
lowing his tired soldiers a two hours' rest, wl\ile, with his staff' aided 
by orders from his commander, he prepared the road so that his 
troops could march with facility. 

The suggestion that the troops could march on the railroad does 
not help the matter, for ten thousand men after stumbling over cross- 
ties and trestles on a dark night for nine miles would be of little value 
the next day. 

Now, bear in mind that on the oi)euing of Porter's trial, General 
Pope swore as follows (page 13, Ex, Doc. No. 71, Thirty-seventh 
Congress, third session, record of Fitz- John Porter court-martial) : 

By the Judge- Advocatk : 
Question. What was the character of the night; was it starlight? 
Answer. Yes, sir; as I remember, it was a clear night. * * * There was no 
difficulty in marching, so far as the night was concerned. 

Major-General Heintzelinan, a witness for the prosecution on Po 

ter's trial, testified (see proceedings of court cited, Schotield board, 

page 80, 81): 

It was very difficult to march on the railroad in the night. Some of the rails 
were torn up, ties piled on the track, culverts destroyed, and bridges burned. It 
was very dark. In the course of the night we had a drizzling rain. 

General Reynolds (page 169 court-martial record) testified : 

It was a very dark night. 

I shouhl not have considered it practicable to march that night. I should have 
considered it a very precarious undertaking. 

These distinguished officers, Major-Geueral Heintzelinan and Gen- 
eral Reynolds, are sustained in tbcir testimony that the night was 
very dark by the following array of witnesses (I will cite the House 
to the pages where their evidence can be found in the court-martial 
records ; the pages referred to are the marginal pages in the Scho- 
field board record): Col. Robert E. Cleary, page 121 ; Capt. B. F. Fi- 
field, i)age 123 ; Capt. George Montieth, page 126 ; Col. Frederick T. 
Locke, page 134; General Charles Grilfiii, pages KiO and 1(51; Col. 
J. P. Brinton, page 205; General Robert- C. Buchanan, page 214; 
General GeorgeD. Rnggles, page 27!). All the.se witnesses testify that 
the night was very dark, and some of them swear tliat it was rain- 



17 

ing. And the substance of all their testimony shows that to have 
made the march either on the railroad or the dirt I'oad or across the 
fields would have been almost impossible, and would have destroyed 
the efficiency of the army corps for any service the following day. 
This evidence also flatly contradicts the evidence of General Pope. 

Now, as General Pope is flatly contradicted by this array of wit- 
nesses upon an important point, and as we have seen that he contra- 
dicted himself on another important point, and as this is but a sam- 
pleof the want of accuracy in very many points in his evidence, can 
the American people allow the honor of Fitzz-John Porter to be affected 
by any statement of such a man ? 

When Porter reached Bristoe Station the uext morning, about 8 
o'clock, he received no order to jiroceed farther. 

To show that 

KO ATTACK WAS EXPECTED, 

I will read General Pope's orders to his other commanders: 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Bristoe Station, Axigust 27, 1862 — 9 o'clock p. m. 
Major-Gen eral McDowell: 

At daylight to-morrow nioruing march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your 
whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left 
well to the east. Jackson, Ervell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Ma- 
nassas Junction. We had a severe fight ivith them to-day, driving them back several 
miles along the railroad. If yon trill march jiromptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn 
of day upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno 
to march from GainesvlUeat the same hour ui)on Manassas Junction, and Kearney, 
who is in his rear, to march on Bristoe at daybreak. Be expeditious and the day 
is our own. 

JNO. POPE, 
Major-General Coiwmanding. 

Hkadquarteks, Bristoe, 
August 27, 1862—9 o'clock p. m. 
MajorGeneral Keaknev: 

At the very earliest blush of dawn push forward with your command with all 
speed to this place. Tou cannot he more than three or four miles distant. Jack- 
son, A. P. Hill, and Ewell are in front of us. Hooker has had a severe light with 
them to-day. McDowell marches upon Manassas .Junction from Gainesville to- 
morrow at daybreak ; Reno upon the same place at the same hour. I want you 
here at day-dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole crowd. Be prompt and 
expeditious, and never mind wagon trains or roads till this atfair is over. Lieu' 
tenant Brooks will deliver you this communication. He has one for General 
Reno and one for General McDowell. Please have these dispatches sent forward 
instantly by a trusty staff officer, who will be .sure to deliver them without fail ; 

WH 2 



^^18 

and iiiaku him bring back a receipt to you befotc daylight. Lieutenant Brooks 
•will remain with you and bring you to this camp. U.se the cavalry I send yoxi to 
escort your staft" officer to McDowell and Reno. 

JXO. POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. 



BuiSTOK Station, August 27, 1862 — 9 p. m. 
To Major General Keno : Marcli at earliest dawn of day, with your whole command, 
on Manassas Junction. Jackxon, Etvell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and 
that place, and if you areprompt and expeditious we shall bag the whole crowd. Mc- 
Dowell advances upon Manassas Junction from Gainesville at the same hour ; 
Kearney on Bristoe. As you value success, be off at the earliest blush of day. Ac- 
knowledge the receipt of this, and do not stop to look for roads, and, if neces- 
sary, leave guards with your trains. Push across the country wherever artillery 
can be hauled. I rely on your speed. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- General Com,mandinq. 

It will be ob,served that the other troops of Pope's array were or- 
dered to march at daylight, aud all were notified that the niovemout 
proposed was an aogressive one. 

I would here call attention to what I regard as an 

IMPORTANT FACT. 

The order to Kearney said : 

At the very earliest blush of dawn push forward with your command with all 
speed to this place. You cannot be more thiin three or four miles distant. 

It also contained these words : 

I want you here at day-dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole crowd. 

Although Kearney had but three or four miles to travel, while 
Porter had to travel nine or ten miles, Porter reached Bristoe Station 
at 8 a. m., at the same time that Kearney arrived. Kearney, up to 
the day of his death, was so commended <as to cause him to be con- 
sidered a projier officer to be jjut in command of the army. 

The next day Pope, over his own signature, informed Kearney that — 

McDowell had intercepted the retreat of the enemy. 
And in the same communication he said: 

I desire you to move forward at 1 o'clock to-night, even if you can carry with you 
no more than 2,000 men. * * * The enemy is not nu)re than three and a half 
mUes from you. Seize any of the people of the town to guide you. Advance cau- 
tiously and drive in the enemy's pickets to-night and at early dawn attack him 
vigorously. Be sure to march not lati-r than 1 with all the men von can take. 



1*J 

The evidence of Major-General Heiutzelmau, witness for the pros- 
ecution (marginal page 610, Schofield board report) is : 

Direct-examination : 

Question. Will you read to the board tbo^sc events whicli you noted at the time 
August 29, 1862 ? 

Answer. Centreville, Friday, August 29, 1862: Kearney did not get off until after 
day-light. * "' * In the night an order came for Kearney to advance at 1 a. m. 
and attack the enemy. Hooker, at 3 a. m., was to support him. The report was that 
Generel McDowell had intercepted the enemy, and the next morning I started at 
daylight as I was directed. When I got to where Kearney was bis division had not 
started. 

Now, bear in mind that while General Kearney was delaying six 
or seven hours, in complying with a most positive and peremptory 
order to move at 1 o'clock and attack the enemy at daylight, Porter, 
as we shall soou see, was obeying Pojie's order to march at 3 a. m., 
with most implicit accuracy and promptness. As not even an ex- 
planation was recjuired of Kearney, it must be presumed that Pope 
recognized that he made the delay for good reasons. 

I am not permitted, under the rnles of Congress, to allude to the 
able speeches of Senators, but I am authorized to refer to their pub- 
lished letters, oue of which, under date of November 23, 1882, I find 
in the Chicago Tribune. 

General Logan, in this letter, under the heading 

rorE's ORDEu to porter, 
says: 

Anticipating an attack from the confederate forces on the morning of the 28tli. 

General Logan commits an error here, because Pope's order to Porter 
directed him (Porter) to start so as to be at Bristoe Station the morn- 
ing of the 28th ; not for the purpose of resisting au attack, but quite 
the contrary, for the purpose of inaugurating au aggressive move- 
ment. I will give the exact language of General Pope in his order 
to Porter : 

The eneiuy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must 
■drive him from Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, 
where McDowell is. 

In this connection, I will state that all the proof shows that at the 
hour Porter left Warrenton Junction thei-e was not a confederate at 
Manassas, nor between that place and Gainesville. 

General Logan, in his letter, also uses these woi'ds : 

Hooker's command being about out of ammunition. 



^^20 

If it was true that Hooker was about out of ainnmnition, General 
Pope did not know it when he made the 6.30 order of the 27th, and 
therefore it could not have entered into his reasons for sending the 
order. 

The proof shows that the report regarding the scarcity of ammu- 
nition did not reach Pope until after dark, and it appears that 
Hooker did not get through with his fight until dark, which was 
some time after Pope wrote the order, and so far from its being 
proven that he was out of ammunition, distinguished officers of 
Hooker's corps say that there was no scarcity; and if Hooker had 
needed animuuition is it not probable that General Pope would have 
ordered supplies from General Kearney, who was but four miles dis- 
tant, and whom Pope ordered to start at daylight to Bristoe Station? 
In addition, it must be remembered that General Pope's general sup- 
ply train was then in the road which led to that place. 

The first allusion I find to this matter is in General Pope's official 
report. 

General Logan also gives another reason why General Pope made 
the 6.30 order of the 27th. General Logan's words are : 

Inasmuch as he desired to send a portion of his forces in the direction of Gaines- 
ville and on to Thoroughfare Gap, so as to impede the advance of Longstreet, 
■who was then marching rapidly to join Jackson. 

This could not have been General Pope's purpose, because his cor- 
respondence shows that he had no idea at that time that Longstreet 
was anywhere near Thoroughfare Gap, marching to join Jackson. 

It was two days after, that is, on the 29th, that General Pope says 
he learned of Longstreet's advance. 

The words General Pope used on the 29th were: 

The indications are that the force of the enemy is moving in tliis direction at a 
pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or nest day. 

But, in passing, let me make this comment. If General Logan is 
correct in liis assumption that the purpose of Pope's order of the 27th 
was for Porter to impede the advance of Longstreet, and if it was 
true that Longstreet was then marching rapidly to join Jackson, how 
can General Logan or General Pope, or any one else, deny that on 
the 29th Longstreet was in front of Porter ? 

But as a conclusiv^e answer to the proseciitors and persecutors of 



21 

General Porter, ^ ho still say that he should have literally complied 
with the order, and started to march at 1 o'clock in the night, I will 
read the opinion expressed by General Grant upon this subject, and 
will not weaken his forcible way of treating the matter by any further 
remarks of my own : 

His troops had been niaiching all day, were very much fatigued, some of them 
only having just arrived in camp and had their supper, when the order to march 
at 1 o'clock was received. The night, as shown in the testimony before the court 
which tried Porter, and as confirmed by the evidence given in what was known 
as the SchofteUl board, was extren.ely dark ; the road very narrow, with nnmer 
0U8 cuts and streams passing through it; bounded by woods on both sides m 
many places, with no place where the open country could be taken for the march 
of troops- and blocked up with about 2,000 army wagons, many of them mired 
in the narrow road, so that the officer who conveyed this order to General Porter 
was over three hours on horseback, in making the distance of ten miles. Porter 
was expected, with fatigued troops, worn with long marches, on scanty rations, 
to make a inarch on a very dark night, through a blockaded road, more rapidly 
than a single aid-de-camp, unincumbered, had been able to gel through on horse- 
When he received the order he showed it to his leading generals, and, appar- 
ently with one accord, they decided that the movement at that hour was impossi- 
ble- further that uo time couhl possibly be gained by so early a start, and that 
if they should start at that hour and get through to Bristoe Station at the time 
designated the troops would not be fit for either fighting or marching on their 
arrival at that point. Porter replied, however, " Hero is the order, and it must be 
obeyed-" but, after further consultation, he decided, as did his generals, that a 
posiponement of two hours in starting the march would enable them to get through 
as quick as if the men wer.r kept on foot and under arms while the road was being 
cleared and that the men would be in much better condition for service on their 
arrival at their destination. He was entirely justified in exerci.sing his own judg- 
ment in this matter, because the order shows that he was not to take part in any 
battle when he arrived there, but was wanted to pursue a fleeing enemy. He did 
not leave the commanding general in ignorance of his proposed delay, nor of the 
reasons for it, but at once sent a request that the general commanding should send 
back cavalry (he had none himself) and ch av . ..e road near him of incumbrances, so 
that the marcli might be unobstructed. 

It is shown that a literal obedience of the order of the 27th of August was a 
physical impossibility It is further shown that General Porter was desirous of 
obeyi"g it literally, so f.ir as was practicable, but was prevailed upon by his lead- 
in- generals-against whom a suspicion of disloyalty to their commander or to 
the cause has never been eutertained-to do what his own judgment approved as 
the best thing to do, to make a later start with a view of arriving at his destina- 
tion as early as it was possible for him to an ive there, and to give to his jaded and 
worn troops two hours more of needed rest. If the night had been clear and the 
road an open one there would not have been as much ju.stification for the exercise 
of his discretion in the matter ; but there is no doubt but that he would have 
arrived at Bristoe Station just as early, and with his troops in much better condi- 
tion if lie had started at early dawn instead of at the hour he did, and the inter- 
v. niu- ti.iie liad b.en u.sed in clearing the road for his troops when they did march. 
Wh re there were op.n spaces along the line of the road they were either marshy, 
filled with stumps of trees, and impossible to march over, or were crowded with 



22 

army wagous, so that the track of his army was limited to the incumbered narrow 
road between the two points designated in the order, which could be cleared only 
by the wagons being moved ahead, as requested of Pope. 

Much of the testimony before the court and before the army board might be 
quoted to confirm what is here stated ; but as this is all accessible to the reader I 
will not lengthen this statement by quoting it. 

.SECOND ssrEOIFICATION. 

We uow come, Mr. Speaker, to the second specitication, which re- 
fers to what is called the joint order. General Porter received it 
about noon, 12 o'clock, on August 2!>. The entire specification reads: 

Sl'ECn'lCATION 21).— In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, 
being in front of the enemy, at Manassas, Virginia, on or about the morning of 
August 29, 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior com- 
manding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit: 

Heahqi'auteks Ahmv of VntcjNiA, 

Centrerillc, Awgvst 29, 1862. 
Generals McDowell and Poktek : 

You will please move forward witli your Joint commands towards Gainesville. 
1 sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heint- 
zelman, Sigel, and Eeno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be 
not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communication is established 
between this force and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be nec- 
essary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be 
so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, 
and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except 
what I sent by aid-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the 
Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and 
rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out 
where General McDowell was until a late houi' this morning. General McDowell 
will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts and instruct him 
to join the other divisions of his corps as .soon as practicable. If any considerable 
advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly 
carried out. One thing must be held in view : That the troops must occupy a posi- 
tion from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications 
are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that 
will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own headquarters 
will, for the present, be with Heiut/.elnian's corps or at this place. 

JOHN POPE, 
Mojor-Oeneral, Commanding. 

Which order the said Major-Genoral Porter did then and there disobey. Thid 
at or near Manassas, In the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862. 

The charge that Porter delayed in obeying this order directing 
that McDowell and himself march towards Gainesville is certainly 
without foundation. 

He did not receive the order until 1*2 o'clock, and all the proof 
shows he had anticipated the order and had fully executed it. He 
had "moved forward with his command toward Gainesville" as far 



33 

as be could go, and lie had fully complied with the jjart of the order 
■which said — 

I desire that as soon as coiuiminication is established between this force (that on 
his right), and yonr force, the whole command shall, halt. 

He had established couimuuication with the force ou his right, 
aud he had formed line to engage Lougstreet. whose forces were 
drawn up iu his immediate front. 

Even General McDowell testifies that Forter had complied with the 
directions of the order before it reached him, and all the facts show 
that General Porter gave an intelligent and prompt compliance with 
this and the two preceding orders which he received that day; and 
th« proof also shows that General McDowell, who was senior to 
Porter, was present when Porter received the order; that he assumed 
command and became responsible for the movements of General 
Porter's cordis. 

To use the 

I.ANOUAC.K OF THK SCIIOFIELI) UOARU : 

McDowell arrived on the field, * •* assumed the command, and arrested For. 
ter's advance. 

General McDowell's exact language while testifying upon this 
point against Porter was (see record, page 83) : 

At that time I conceived General Porter to be under me. When the joint order 
reached ns we were doing what that joint order directed lis to do. That joint 
order found the troops in the position in which it directed them to be. 

I cannot do better than to read an extract from the report of the 
Schofield board, which explains these views very full}': 

These charges and specifications certainly bear no discernible resemblance to 
the facts of the case as now established. Tet it has been our duty to carefully 
compare with these facts the views entertained by the court-martial, as shown 
in the findings and in the review of the case which was prepared for the informa- 
tion of the President by the judge-advocate-general, who had conducted the 
prosecution, and thus to clearly perceive every error into which the court-martial 
was led. We trust it is not necessary for us to submit in detail the results of this 
comparison, and that it will be sufficient [or nato point out the fundamental errors, 
and to say that all the essential facts in every instance stand out in the clear and abso- 
lute contrast to those supposed facts upon which General Porter ivas adjudged guilty. 

The fundamentiil errors upon which the conviction of General Porter depended 
may be summed up in few words. It was maintained, and apparently established 
to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only about one-lialf of the confederate 
army was on the field of Manassas on the 29th of August, while General Lee, 
with the other half, was still beyond the Bull Run Mountains ; that GeneralPope's 
army, exclusive of Porter's corps, was engaged in a severe and nesirly equal con- 
test with the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack whicli Porter was 



II 



^24 

expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of tlie confed- 
erate force in tbcir front under General Jackson ; that McDowell and Porter, with 
their joint forces, Porter's loading;, had advanced towards Gainesville until the 
head of their column had reached a j)oint near the Warrenton turnpike, where 
they found a division of confederate troops, "seventeen regiments," which Bu- 
ford had counted as they passed through Gainesville, niarchinj; along the road 
across Porter's front, and going toward the field of battle at Groveton ; that 
McDowell ordered Porter to at once attack that column thus moving to join Jack- 
son, or tlie Hank and rear of the line if they had formed iu line, while he would 
take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw them upon the enemy's 
center near Groveton; that Porter, McDowell Iiaving then separated from him, 
disobeyed that order to attack, allowed that division of the enemy's troops to pass 
him unmolested, and then fell backandretreated toward Manassas Junction ; that 
Porter then remained in the rear all the afternoon, listening to the sounds of battle 
and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the center and 
right of the field ; that this division of the enemy having passed Porter's column 
and formed on the right of Jackson's line near Groveton, an order was sent to 
Porter to attack the right flank or rear of the enemy's line, upon which his own 
line of march must bring him, but that he had willfully disobeyed, and made no 
attempt to execute that order ; that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy 
Jackson's detached force before the other wing of General Lee's army could join 
it, and that this junction having been etfected during the night of the 29th, the 
defeat of General Pope's army on tlie 30th thus resulted from General Porter's 
neglect and disobedience. 

Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors the following allimportant facts 
are fully established : 

As Porter was advancing toward Gainesville, ami while yet nearly four miles 
from that place and more than two miles from the nearest point of the Warren- 
ton turnpike, he met the right wing of the confederate army, 25,000 strong, which 
had arrived on the field that morning and was already in line of battle. Not be- 
ing at that moment quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being 
then under orders from Pope to push rapidlj- toward Gainesville, Porter was 
pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, when McDowell arrived on 
the field with later information of the enemy, and later and very diiferent orders 
from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested Porter's advance. This latter 
information left no room for doubt that the main body of Lee's army was already 
on the tield and far in advance of Pope's army in preparation for battle. Gen- 
eral McDowell promptly decided not to attempt to go farther to the front, but to 
deploy his column so as to form line in connection with General Pope's right 
wing, which was then engaged with Jackson. To do this General McDowell 
separated his corps entirely from General Porter's, and thus relinquished the 
command and all right to the command of Portei's corps. McDowell did not 
give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any order whatever to gov- 
ern his action after their separation. 

It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to General Porter in any 
way the erroneous view of the military situation which was afterward main- 
tained before court-martial, nor that he suggested to General Porter any expecta- 
tion that he would make an attack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the 
witnesses as to what was actually said and done, the information which McDow- 
ell and Porter then had respecting the enemy, and the movement which McDow- 
ell decided to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively that 
there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to stand on 
the defensive and hold his position until McDowell's movement could be com- 



25 

pleted. It would have indicated a great error of military judgment to have done 
or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then fully known to both McDowell 
and Porter. 

General Pope appears from his orders and from his testimony to have been at 
that time wholly ignorant of the true situation. He had disapproved of the send- 
ing of Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap to meet Longstreet on the '28th, believing 
that the main body of Lee's army could not reach the field of Manassas before 
the night of the 30th. Hence he sent the order to Porter dated 4.30 p. m. to attack 
Jackson's right flank or rear. Fortunately that order did not roach Porter until 
about sunset, too late for any attack to be made. Any attack which Porter could 
have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily have been fruitless of any 
good lesalt. 

Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intelligent conduct that afternoon saved the Union 
army from the defeat which would otherwise have resulted thai day from the enemy's 
more speedy concentration. The only seriously critical period of that campaign, 
namely, between 11 a. m. and sunset of August 29, was thus safely passed. Porter 
had understood and appreciated the military situation, and, so far as he had acted 
upon his own judgment, his action had been wise and judicious. For the disaster 
of the succeeding day he was in no degree responsible. Whosoever ehe may have 
been responsible, it did not flow from any action or inaction of his. 

The judgment of the court-martial upon General Porter's conduct was evidently 
based upon greatly erroneous impressions, not only respecting what that conduct 
really was and the orders under which he was acting, but also respecting all the 
circumstances under which he acted. Especially was this true in respect to the 
character of the battle of the 29th of August. That battle consisted of a number 
of sharp and gallant combats between small portions of the opposing forces. 
Those combats were of short duration, and were separated by long intervals of 
simple skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after 6 o'clock only a small part of 
the troops on either side were eng.iged at any time during the afternoon. Then, 
about sunset, one additional division on each side was engage;! near Groveton. 
The musketry of that last contest and the yells of the confederate troops about 
dark were distinctly heard by the oiBcers of Porter's corps; but at no other time 
during all that afternoon was the volume of musketry such that it could be heard 
at the position of Porter's troops. No sound but that of artillery was heard by 
them during all those hours when Porter was understood by the court-martial to 
have been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immediately to his 
right. And those sounds of artillery were by no means such as to indicate a gen- 
eral battle. 

The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have somehow been 
strangely confounded with each other. Even the confederate reports have since 
the termination of the war been similarly misconstrued. Those of the 30th have 
been misquoted as referring to the 29th, thus to prove that a furious battle was 
going on while Port«r was comparatively inactive on the 29th. The fierce and 
gallant struggle of his own troops on the 30th has thus been used to sustain the 
original error under which he was condemned. General Porter was in eifect con- 
demned for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such was the eiTor upon 
which General Porter was pronounced guilty of the most shameful crime known 
among si.ldiers. We believe not one among all the gallant soldiers on that bloody field 
was less deserving of such condemnation than he. 

This board, whose material was of the very best, composed of men 

of character, learning, and integrity, not only acquits Porter, but 

passes upon him and his gallant conduct the highest eulogy. They 



show a generous esigerness to piibliah these exculpatory facts, recog- 
nizing that it is their great privilege to help to lift away the obloquy 
which has so long rested upon the name and character of a great and 
noble man. Their deliberations were attended with fairness, cau- 
tion, energy, and openness, such as to exclude the idea of prejudice 
on one side or partiality on the other. And the conclusion reached 
by this board has been indorsed by the American ijeople. 

This board, in addition to wbatis set out in the foregoing extract, 
as the conclusion of its labors, after the most patient aud solemn 
deliberation, under the guidance of the truths of history aud the 
testimony before them, elaborately examined and compared with 
the testimony upon which the convicting court-martial had acted, 
proceed to recommend in these words : 

Having thus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor to report, 
in accordance with the President's order, tliat, in our opinion, jiisHce lequiies at 
his hands such action as may be necessarj- to annul ami set aside tlu^ findings aud 
sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General FitzJohii Porter, aud 
to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him— such restora- 
tion to take ettect from the date of his dismissal from service. 

MOKE OF GENElt.^L I.OGAN'S MISTAKES. 

General Logan, in the newspaper article, in discussing the opera 

tions of August 29, says : 

Pope issued an order at 3 o'clock a. m. for Porter to move at daylight to Centre 
ville. This order being a verbal order, Porter did not obey it. 

General Logan is again mistaken. This order was not verbal; it 
was written, and appears in records of the court of the Schofield 
board, aud in all the proceedings. I read from the proceedings of 
the Schotield board, page 18, and I also find it in the Congre.ssiojjal 
Record of January, 188:5 : 

Heaoquarteks Aumv of Virsima, 
Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862—3 a. m. 
GENERAt. : McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is imme- 
diately on the right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to .attack the 
enemj-'s rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Cen- 
treville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains 
to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early liour in the 
morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is nec- 
essary. 

I am. general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Porter. 

General Porter obeyed the order promptly, and marched at least 
six miles to a point beyond Manassfis Junction. 



27 

It 18 not suiprisiug that an experienced soldier like General Logan 
should get an impression that the order was not obeyed. No doubt 
his study of the campaign convinced him that Porter might have 
doubted its authenticity and hesitated a moment to inquire into its 
integrity before ronsiug his tired troops for a march, pursuant to an 
order which showed inconsistency upon its face. 

This order informed Porter that a severe engagement was likely to 
take place near Ccntreville, and therefore he is told that " his jires- 
ence is necessary." 

Now, General Logan's stuily of the case no doubt convinced him 
that so eminent a soldier as General Porter could see in a moment 
that the order was devoid of purpose; that it carried him away from 
the tield of action, and not towards a i)oint where " a severe engage- 
ment was likely to take place." 

General Logan's study of the case showed him that Porter knew 
Jackson's corps was not at or near Centreville, but that the bulk of 
his troops were between Groveton and Sudley's Springs. 

General Logan's study of the case also showed him that Porter 
knew of the contradictory orders which General Pope sent to Gene- 
ral McDowell the day previous, viz : 

First. To march with his whole force to Manassas. 

Second. To march upon Centreville. 

Third. To march upon Gum Spring. 

It is possible General Logan felt that if he had been in Porter's 
place he would have asked exj)lanations before obeying the order. 

But, as I have asserted, General Porter obeyed the order without 
hesitation, and continued to march as directed, until General Pope, 
convinced that the order was wrong, hastened to countermand it, 
and to direct Porter to march upon Gainesville. 

General Logax, continuing the narrative, says : 

General Pope in the mean time, finding that Longstreet was moving to the sup- 
port of Jackson and that Porter was still not moving, changed his order and put 
it in writing to Porter to avoid any excuse on Porter's part. The order was in the 
following language : 

Heauquakters Army of Vuiginia, 

Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
To Major-General Fitz-Johx Porter : 

Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with 
you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. 
Be expeditious or we will lose much. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General, Commanding. 
The order was handed to General Porter about 9 o'clock. His troops were then 
ready to move. 



^28 

This last expression would iudicate that Porter had not yet left 
his camp, near Bristoe Station, .when in point of fact he was six 
miles away, two miles beyond Manassas Junction. 

General Logan then says that Porter did not Tiiove in compliance 
with that order until 10 o'clock, and that— 

He moved slowly and leisurely and arrived at Dawkins Branch at 12 o'clock, a 
distance of five miles. 

I admit that this was not rapid marching, but without any orders 
to hasten, it was fair speed for a hot August day, and it must be re- 
membered that these troops were up before day and had already 
marched six miles before commencing the five-mile march referred to. 

General Logan further says: 

At Dawkins Branch General McDowell came up to the head of Porter's column, 
having what is known as the joint order, or an order to McDowell and Poller both 

to proceed to Gainesville. 

* * * * * * * 

At this point McDowell showed Porter the joint order to proceed to Gainesville, 
at the same time giving him the information sent to Pope by Buford of the pas- 
sage of the fifteen regiments of infantry and five hundred cavalry through Gaines- 
ville that morning. This was the only information that Porter had on the subject 
of Longstreet's forces, as he stated himself 

General Logan is certainly mistaken in this last statement, for the 
proof shows that Porter obtained his information from various other 
sources, among which was the fact that hehad taken prisoners be- 
longing to Longstreet's corps. 

General Logan also says : 

McDowell finding that it was impossible to pa.ss Porter's forces in the road with 
his command went back and took his command on a road off to the right, reaching 
out to the rear ot Pope's forces that were then engaged in battle. He marched 
and ari'ived in time to put his forces in action and fought them until 9 o'clock that 
evening. 

The proof shows that he is mistaken on this point. General Mc- 
Dowell says that the fight eommenced about sundown and lasted 
nearly an hour. What was called General Pope's fight of the 29th 
was on Pope's right, fully three miles off. The fight on the Warren- 
ton pike was part of King's division, under Hatch, engaged with 
Hood's two brigades. 

THIRD SPECIFICATION. 

We now come, Mr. Speaker, to the third and last specification, which 
embodies what has been termed the 4.30 order, and charged that 



29 

General Porter received and failed ,to comply with the directions it 
contained. I will read : 

Specification 3d.— In this: That the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, 
having been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 
29th of August, 1862, did on that day receive from Major-General John Pope, his 
superior and commanding otficer, a lawful order, in the following letters and fig- 
ures, to wit : 

Headquarters in the Field, August 29, 1862—4.30 p. m. 
Major-General Porter: 

Tour line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to 
push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, 
keeping your right in communication with General Keynolds. The enemy is 
massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage 
their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to 
your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right 
and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-Oeneral, Commanding. 

"Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey, and 
did fail to push forward his forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, 
and in all other respects did fail to obey said order. This at or near Manassas, in 
the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862. 

General Logan insist.s that Longstreet was not in Porter's front, 

and that he conld easily have complied with the order and attacked 

the enemy's flank and rear. He says : 

General Grant says: "And now it is known by others, as it was known by 
Porter at the time, that Longstreet, with some 25,000 men, was in position con- 
fronting Porter by 12 o'clock on the 29th of August, four and a half hours before 
the 4.30 order was written." 

Upon what this statement of General Grant is based it is impossible for me to 
understand. In the first place Porter did not know that Longstreet was there 
with 25,000 men, nor did he know, unless he made a false statement, anything 
about the force, except what General McDowell told him was his information re- 
ceived from General Buford. Nor was Longstreet confronting Porter. He was 
two and a half miles away from Porter; was not on the same road that Porter was, 
but was forming west of the old Manassas Railroad, on Pageland Lane, to the 
right rear of Jackson's forces, fronting the forces under Pope, on Pope's left flank, 
that were then attacking Jackson. His front was entirely in a diflferent direction 
from Porter. 

The evidence is so dear that General Logax is mistaken regarding 
this matter that I might be excused if I did not sustain the assertion 
by reading evidence upon the subject. 

General Robert E. Lee says: 

Longstreet's command arrived within supporting distance of Jackson the 29th 
of August, 1862, between 9 and 10 a. m., and his lines were formed by noon. 

General Longstreet says : 
My command arrived 9 a. m., the 29th August, near Groveton. * * * My 



coinmaud was dei)loyeil iu double Hues foi attuck between 10 a. lu. and 12 ni. ou 
the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across the turnpike and Manassas Gap 
Kailroad. * * * My command was ready to receive any attack after 11 a. m., 
and wo were particularly anxious to bring on the battle after 12 m., General Lee 
more so than the rest. 

What I liavc just read is from letters written hy tliese otliceis since 
the war closed. 

To show that their meiuory was correct, I will now read extracts 
from official reports which were indited while these events were 
transpiring. 

I will first read extracts from a letter written by (Jeneral Lee to 

President Davis : 

Headquauteks Aumt of Northwesteun Vhioima, 

GhantilUj, Va., September 3, 1862. 
Mr. PuEsiUENT : My letter of the 30th ultimo will have informed your excellency 
of the progress of this army to that date. General Longstreet's division, having 
arrived the day previous, was formed in order of battle on the right of General 
Jackson, who had been engaged with the inemy since morning, resisting an attack 
commenced on the 28th. The enemy on the latter day was vigorously vepnlsed, 
leaving his numerous dead and wounded on the field. His attack ou the morning 
of the 29th was feeble, but became warmer in the afternoon, when he was again 
repulsed by both wings of the army, his loss on this day, as stated in his published 
report, herewith inclosed, amoauting to 8,000 killed and wounded. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

E. E. LEE. General. 
To His Excellency Jefkekson Davis, 

President Confederate States of America. 

I will now read an extract from the 

UKrOUT OF ueutenaxt hazlett 

who commanded the battery in Pope's army: 

Minor's Hill, Ya., September :i, 1862. 
Captain Martin, Chief of Division Artillery : 

"We took up a position ou an eminence * opposite to where the enemy were ascer- 
tained to be, and in a short time they opened on a column of our infantry with one 
gun, a 6-pounder. We replied, but with what effect could not be ascertained, as 
the enemy were concealed in the woods. The enemy kept up their firing for a very 
short time, none of their shots reaching us, and then ceased, but shortly after 
opened upon us again tvith two rifled guns, one of them being a 10-pounder Parrott. 
None of their shots took eflect in the battery, though some of the infantry some 
distance in the rear were injured by ricochet shots. A t this same time clouds of dicst were 
seen rising in woods near the enemy's batteries. / directed part of the guns of the 
battery on this dust and part on the enemy's batteries. The effect of none of these 
shots could be seen for the woods, but shortly after a large column of infantry \ ap- 
peared in an opening in the woods, on which the guns, which could see into this 
place, were immediately turned with very good ett'ect, as the shells could be seen 



* Dawkins Branch. t Longstreet's. 



31 

burgting directly in the coZwTOn, -which broke and van Into the -woods fior shelter, but 
soon again formed, onh' to be again dispersed. 



Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

CHAS. E. HAZLETT, 
First Lieutenant, Fifth Aitillery. 

The report of General M. D. Corse, iu whose brigade these shot 
fell, corroborates the statement of Lieutenaut Hazlett. 

Lieutcnaut Hazlett also made a report to Captain Perkins, assist- 
ant adjntant-general, an extract from which I will read: 

The effect of our tirinji on their artillery could not be ascertained, but several 
limes their infantry made their appearance, -when the effect of our fire on them was 
plainly visible, causing them to break and seek shelter out of sight. 

From au avniy of evidence ivhich cannot he refuted, the advisory board 

fonud and asserted (see page 1710) : 

The fiict is that Longstreet with four divisions of full '25,000 men was there on 
the field before Porter arrived with his two divisions of 9,000 men ; that the con- 
federate geueralin-chief was there in pei'son at least two or three hours before 
the commander of the Army of Virginia himself arrived on the field, and that 
Porter with his two divisions saved the Army of Virginia that day from the disaster 
7iaturally due to the enemy's early preparation for battle. 

This and much other conclusive evidence to the same eliect is now 
available to every one, and it shows beyond question that Porter 
could not, at 6 o'clock, when he received the order, have attacked 
Jackson's flank or rear. It shows he could not have done so at 4.30 
when the order was written, nor for live hours prior to 4.30. 

Therefore, yielding every other point for the present, Porter was 
excused from any effort at executing the 4.30 order, because it was 
absolutely impossible for him to have done so. He was two miles and 
a half from Jackson's flank ; the countrj- was rugged and ditches and 
other obstacles intervened, and in addition the presence of Ijongstreet 
with 25,000 men was a conclusive obstacle. 

The distinguished writer of the Tribune article, apparently finding 
that he could not maintain the position that Porter could have at- 
tacked Jackson's flank, changes his line of argument and attempts 
to show that even under such a state of facts Porter was wrong. 

He says : 

Thus General Grant jjuts Porter .squarely in front of Longstreei with his 25,000 
men, and says that he could not have obej'ed the order without first whipping 
Longstreefs '-'5,000 with 10,000 men. 



^^32 

General Logan, then, arguing from General Grant's standpoint, 
says: 

He was only required to attack the right flank of the enemy, and the right flank 
of the enemj- was the right flank of Longstreet's command. He was part of the 
enemy, his flank heing in the direction of Porter. 

General Grant says: "He was three miles awiiy from Jackson's flank." 

If so, then why not attack Longstreot, whose flank was sticking out in air 
where Porter could have attacked it, as it was the only flank that presented itself 
where he could attack? How, then, was he to construe the order? Was he to 
order his men to attack Jackson when the order did not say so ? "Was he to say, 
"Longstreet's flank is sticking out there; I can see it; but I am not to attack 
that; he is not the enemy ; theorder says to attack the enemy?" Will he say that 
does not mean to attack Long.street? 

This is the logic of General Grant's position. 

General Grant also assumes that to have attacked under that order would have 
taken Porter until 9 o'clock, inasmuch as he would have to make disposition of 
aome of his troops, issue ordeis, &c. 

Now, admitting, for the sake of argument, that it was received as 
claimed, I will explain why General Porter conld not have complied 
with the 4.30 order by an attack on General Longstreet's flank and 
rear as urged by General Logax. 

The A'ery order we are considering directed something besides an 
attack on the enemy's flank and rear. It directed Porter to keep 
his "right in communication with General Reynolds;" also to keep 
"well closed to the right all the time." 

And, again, the same order closed with an admonition that, if com- 
pelled to fall back, to keep "in close communication with the right 
wing." 

Now I submit this diagram which proves that an eff'ort to attack 
Longstreet's right would have cut Porter loose from Pope, and he could 
not have complied with the three last imperative injunctions of the 
4.30 order. 



bo.^sr-t'^^fobotften 



•'^ofrson 




These points having been disposed of, 



33 

TIIK ASSAILANTS OF GENEKAL POKTEIl MAKE A NEW ATTACK. 

One justification for Porter not attacking pursnant to tLe 4.30 
order is this: 

That General Pope issned the order nnder a wrong impression of 
the status, that is to say, Pope ordered Porter to attack Jackson's 
right tlank,'nuder the impression that Lougstreet did not intervene. 

Porter's assaihmts say we have no right to any such assumption. 
They say, achnitting it to be established that Lougstreet was in front 
of Porter at 11 a. m., we must assume that Pope knew it, and there- 
fore we must assume that when he issned the order for Porter to at- 
tack the enemy's flank, he intended him (Porter) to attack the flank 
of General Lougstreet. 

To show the error of this position it is only necessary to again 
allude to what I have just shown. If General Pope had intended 
Porter to attack Lougstreet he would not have added the require- 
ment for him to keep " well closed to the right all the time." 

But there is other incontrovertible e\ idence that General Pope 
did not know that Lougstreet was on Jackson's right and in Porter's 
front. 

The evidenoi' of the prosecuting witness who testified on the trial 
of General Porter in 1802 was such that the majority of the court saw 
fit to find that at 4.30 o'clock on the 29ththe position of the two armies 
was substantially as shown by this diagram : 






Jackson, 
:2,000 men. 



Pope, 
SS.tXJO men. 

and it also appt5ars that they saw fit to find tliat Lougstreet was at 
least twenty-four hours' march distant. 

That General Pope regarded the status at 4.30 as is shown by the 
diagram is further proven by his joint order to McDowell and Porter, 
received by Porter a)>out noon on the 29th. 
WH 3 



lu tliiN Older General Pope said : 

The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction 
at a pace tliat will bring them here hy to-morrow night or next day. 

We thus see that ou the 29th Pope thought Lougstreet was march- 
ing at a pace which wouhl bring hini on the field on the night of the 
30th or on the following day (the 31st). 

General Pope also said in the order : 

The enemy is mas.sed iu the woods in front of ns. 

Bear in mind that he says " the enemy." 

As tliere was no pretense that Longstreet was massed in front of 

Pope, and as he alludes to no other force of the enemy being near, 

he must have supposed such to have been the fact. In addition to 

all this General Pope testified, December 4, 1862 : 

Had General Porter fallen upon the flank of the enemy, as it was hoped, at any 
time up to 8 o'clock that niglit, it is my firm conviction that we sliould have de- 
stroyed the army of Jackson. 

Again he testified, December (3, 1863 : 

General Porter was exi)ected to attack if possible — and as I understood it to be 
practicable— the right fiank of Jackson's forces, and if possible the rear of his 
forces, to prevent, if it were practicable, the junction of Longstreet's forces with 
Jackson's, and to cru.sh Jackson's tlank before Lougstreet could etfect ii junction 
with him. I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that at that time (4.30 p. 
m.) any considerable portion of Longstreet's corps had reached the vicinity of the 
field. I do not know that General Porter, between 5.30 p. m. and 7 o'ch)ck, had the 
enemy imuiediately in his front, though I would think it altogether likely that 
Jackson would have pushed out some force to observe the road between Gaines- 
ville and Manassas Junction. It is altogether likely, therefore, that .some of Jack- 
son's troops were in presence of Geneial Porter's advance, though of my own 
knowledge I do not know that. 

It is hard to conceive how the most prejudiced mind could want 

anything further on this subject, but I will add one word from no 

less a di.stingui.shed soldier than General and Ex-President Grant, 

who said : 

But, even if the position of Lee's army had been thirty-six to forty-eight hoiu-s dis- 
tant, as asserted in the joint order to McDowell and Porter, it would have been im- 
possible for Porter to have obeyed the 4.30 order, because it did not contemplate a 
night attack, and was not leceived b5- Poiter until about dark. To have obeyed it 
would have required .some little preparation, movement of troops, and distribution 
of orders, so that it would have been some time after dark before he could have 
moved from the position he was then occupying, and at least as late as 9 o'clock at 
night before ho could have reached Jackson's tiank to engage it. His efibrts to 
execute the order, notwithstanding its api)arent inapi)ropriateness, demonstrate 
this assertion. 



I feel, with all this proof, that no one will any longer contend that 
General Porter was in any way censurable for anything connected 
with the 4.:^0 order, of which so ranch has been said. 

Yet in the face of all this General Logan says: 

At 5 o'clock (one hour later) General Porter received the "4.30 order " to attack 
the enemy's right and rear at once. At this very moment when he was ordered to 
attack, the larger portion of Longstreet's forces were engaged against Pope a 
forces in front of Jackson, leaving but a small force back under Longstreet for 
the protection of the flank of the army. 

It is clear that there is error in the statement that Porter received 
this order ntfve o'clock. It was written at 4.30, and copies taken ot 
it, and it was carried five and a half miles. 

It yvsispositivehiprorenhefore the Schofield board that tliis order was 
not received by Porter until after 6 p. m. 

In fact, General McDowell there produced a dispatch from Porter, 
dated a p. ni., whicli shows that Porter haduot received the order at 
that hour. Porter claimed and proved in his defense to the same 
effect on the trial in 1862, but the court disregarded this testimony. 
I here call attention to the difficulty experienced by Porter's assail- 
ants in fixing the locality of Longstreet's corps at this hour. One 
witness puts him thirty-six hours' march from Jackson's right tlank, 
another puts him near Gainesville, another to the right and rear of 
Jackson, another directly on Jackson's right, and here we have the 
remarkable assertion that at this hour " Longstreet's forces were en- 
gaged against Pope's forces in front of Jackson." 

Does he mean to say that Longstreet was in front of and between 
Jackson's and Pope's forces f 

All accounts say both Jackson's and Pope's troops were firing. 
If it was true that Longstreet was between the two, receiving fire 
from both front and rear, some report of the many officers engaged 
would have alluded to it, and our first information upon this subject 
would not have been found in a letter to a Chicago paper twenty 
years after these events transpired. 

GENEKAL l-OGAX'S KEMAUlvS ON NAPOLEON'S LEADING MAXIM EXAMINED. 

Having in the beginning of these remarks read some uncoutro- 
verted maxims, I will, now, Mr. Speaker, allude to that maxim of war 
enunciated by the author of the article in the Chicago Tribune, and 



^30 

I beg to state that I iiiako no criticism upon the very creditable mili- 
tary career of this clistingnishetl sohlier. 

The history of General Logan evidences that he never failed to 
conform to the military maxims I have cited, and 1 am justified in 
giA ing this as one of the reasons for his remarkable and successful 
career; and while facts show that General Logan at the head of an 
army in battle was right in the theories he put in practice, I must at 
the same time insist that the same eminent American, while in the 
heat of debate, allows his enthusiasm to carry him away, and thus 
cause him to announce principles that are clearly wrong. 

In the published argument, he docs not allude to the maxims I 
have quoted, but gives this as 

NAl'OLKON'S LEADING MAXTJI : 

One of the <jreat leading maxims iu Napoleon's military experience— you will 
find it in all his campaigns and it was a .standing order to all his corps command- 
ers — was that when the general of the army was not present to give orders, each 
corps commander should march to the sound of the enemy's guns. Tliat was a 
general order in all his campaigns. 

In reply, I beg to state that I have searched in vain to find any 

such priuciple laid down as a maxim of Naijoleon. 

Maxim, as defined by Webster : 

A MAXIM is a guiding principle, ever to be received and admitted in the prac 
tical concerns of life. 

Also, continues Mr. Webster : 

The greatest sentiment, sentence, proposition, or axiom, i. e., of the greate-st 
weight or authority. An established principle or proposition ; a condensed propo- 
sition of important practical truth : an axiom of practical wisdom. 

Axiom, as defiued by AVebster, is: 
An established principle iu some art or science. 
As defined by Worcester : 
A self-evident truth oi- pi'oposition -, an established pi-inciple not re(iuiring proof. 

This idea of marching to the sound of guns very probably arose in 
this way : When a boy, I, iu company with our many patriotic citi- 
zens, on every Fourth of July morning, hastened to the point where we 
heard the aonnd of guns, and after the exhaustion of all available am- 
munition, as well as the strength of the cannoneers, we listened to 
what is called 



37 

FOUKTll OF JULY ELOQUKXCE, 

ill which, of course, much was said of AVashiiigtou, Naiioleou, ami 
other distiuofuished gentlemen. 

No doubt General Logan's experience was very like mine in this 
respect, which may account for the apparent confusion of war 
speeches with war principles. I admit that when I read what is al- 
leged to be a Napoleonic maxim, it sounded so familiar and patriotic 
that I was obliged to reflect for a moment before I could see the ob- 
jections to adopting it as a military maxim. 

The very definition of the word maxim shows that for a proposition 
to become such it ninst be one that will hold good under all circum- 
stances, and not a proposition which could, with iiropriety, only 
sometimes be adoped. In illustration, I recall this incident : A young 
physician determined to practice from personal experience. His 
first patient recovered rajiidly from pneumonia, and learning that 
he had eaten freely of pork and beans, he writes in his note-book: 

" For pneumonia — 2>0'>'1^' ^"'f' heans," and adopting this as a medical 
maxim, he iirescribed the same diet for his next pneumonia patient. 
The very prompt death of the sufferer embarrassed the young doctor, 
and below the former entry he wrote : "For pneumonia: Pork and he,anu 
sometimes.'' We all admit that to ' ' march to the sound of the enemy's 
guns " would sometimes be a very good movement. It was the proper 
thing for Grouchy at 11 a. m., June 18, 1815, but it would not do to 
make this an invariable rule. 

We are all familiar with the fact that the sound of guns is loudest 
where there is the luost artillery, and that strong redoubts are fre- 
quently built where batteries are congregated. 

A¥e are also familiar with the fact that prudent commanders keep 
heavy reserves to defend concentrated artillery ; therefore to "march 
to the sound of the enemy's guns " would sometimes involve an at- 
tack upon the very strongest and possibly impregnable positions, and 
it must be remembered that 

NAPOLEON MODESTLT SUGGESTED 

the proprietj' of seeking to pierce lines at the weakest, not the 
strongest point. 

Again, if we admit this to be a maxim, let us see to what it might 
lead. 



If you, Mr. Speaker, weie coiniiiaudiny an arniy and knew your 
adversary- wonld follow tliis alleged maxim, would you not be in- 
duced to cause the sound of fiun-s at a p()int where an attack would 
be least detrimental to your army ? 

Now, if iu future, our military gentlemen in following the " march- 
to-the-sound-of-the-enemy's-guns" maxim, should strike an impreg- 
nable position, much as mankind is dazzled by the display of heroic 
courage, would not we all, even General Logan, while witnessing the 
terrible shock .and inevitable recoil of broken, shattered, and deci- 
mated columns, involuntarily exclaim : It is magnificent, but it is not 
war? Or if a cunning foe by the sound of guns should lure us from 
the point we should attack, would we not finally be compelled to 
modify this proposition so that it would read "march to the sound 
of the enemy's guns" sometimes, and liaving done this, the proposition 
would no longer be a maxim, and much less a Napoleonic maxim ? 

I beg here to be permitted to suggest that '* to always, in the ab- 
sence of orders, march to the sound of the enemy's guns" is not a 
maxim, for the reason that it conflicts with several undisputed maxims 
which were enunciated and adhered to by Napoleon. 

1. 

It would conflict with the maxim which directs corps command- 
ers — 

To iiiotit boldly by every opportunity. 

2. 

And which admonishes them that — 

The lost moment never returns. 

:?. 

And which commands them to seize — 
A moment in battle when tlie smallest manoeuver decides superiority. 

4. 
And which commands them — 
To mauflBuver to engage fractions of the hostile armies. 

5. 
And which commands them — 
To throw the mass of their forces upon the decisive point 



3i) 

These purposes aud many others essential to siiceess might or might 

not be attained by "marching to the sound of the enemy's gnus." 

There is another, the sixteenth, maxim of Na^ioleon : 

It is an approved maxim of war never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, 
for this reason alone : that he desires it. 

To march to the sound of his guns might be just what the enemy 

wished. I will also read Napoleon's tenth maxim: 

When au army is inferior in numbers, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is es- 
sential to avoid an action. 

For commanders of divisions and corps of such an army to "march 
to the sound of the enemy's guns " might seriously coudict with this 
maxim. 

I might contiune this investigation throngh very many of the re- 
maining seventy-eight maxims of Napoleon, but I will conclude by 
remarking that as this supposed maxim, "march to the sound of the 
enemy's guns" was made the basis and foundation and starting point 
of all the voluminous arguments against General Porter, and as we 
have clearly demonstrated that it is not, never was, and never can 
be either a maxim or an axiom of war, much less a Napoleonic maxim, 
and still mucli less (as claimed by the prosecution) Napoleon's leading 
maxim, let me ask, Mr. Speaker, is there any foundation upon which 
the fabric of the opposing argument can stand ? 

It is evident, as before stated, that the commanding general can- 
not be at the head of every corps "to jirotit boldly by every oppor- 
tunity." If he cannot do it, and corps commanders are simply to liter- 
ally obey orders, how then are they to take advantage of those "mo- 
ments in battles which never return to be prolited by ?" 

I think, Mr. Speaker, that what I have said explains that " to protit 
boldly by. every opportunity" corps and division commanders must 
often strike when, in their discretion and judgment, circumstances 
make it advisable. This nnist be done with orders or without orders. 

If a corps commander is right in attacking withont orders, so he 
must in his discretion 

DISSENT FROM ATTACKING, 

even though ordered by his commander to do so. 

If the army commander is fully possessed of all the facts — if he is 
fully apprised of the military status, and with that knowledge issues 



^40 

an iinh.T, it would l>r luirtl ti> Justify a subcixliiiatc otlicer who hesi- 
tates to obey. A case of thai character comes to my mind. 

dcnerril lieiilc commanded Napoleon's hirge.st corps. He was with 
the Emperor early on the morniiii; of June 10, from whom he received 
ordern lo march with Xe;i lo tjaatre IJras. lleiile was fnlly apprised of 
Blucher's i»osition, and thonght it strange that the attack upon 
the Prussians was delayed. He knew fully the plans of battle for 
both Ligny and Quatre Bras. His duty was to tight under Ney and 
attack the force Wellington had thrown forward from Brussels. 
Written orders show that early on the 16th Soult ordered Reille to 
report to Ney. 

At 9 a. m. Ney is ordered to combine the corps of D'Erlon, Reille, 
and Kellermanu and move on the enemy in front of Qnatre Bras. 

At the same time Napoleon wrote amplifying the instructions, 
both of which letters Nej' received at 11 a. m., and immediately sent 
orders directing the rapid march of these troops. At 10 a. m. Na- 
poleon's orders were repeated and received by Ney at 11.30, but he 
had jireviously received dispatches from Reille, dated Gosselies, 
10.15 a. m., stating that in consequeuce of Prussian forces at Fleurus, 
he would not move until fnrther orders from Ney. This helped to 
delay Ney's attack until after 2 o'clock. 

Had he made the attack two hours earlier, he would have easily 
driven every opposing force beyond the heights of Mtmnt St. Jean, 
and the battle of the 18th would have been fought nearer Brussels 
and on less favorable ground for the allies. 

General Reille has never been blamed for this very brief delay. 

I say he did wrong, because he knew Napoleon w as to attack 
Bluclier near Fleurus. He was marching to Geuapi)e under orders 
received from Napoleon and reiterated by Ney, and information re- 
ceived from General Gerard, of facts which Reille knew, and which 
Napoleon certainly knew when he gave Reile his orders, was no 
justification for a moment's delay. If General lieille was not venaiired 
for delay in that ease, then how entirehj juatifiable was Fitx-John Porter. 

The j)roof shows that during all this campaign there was but one 
order that Porter hesitated a moment in obeying. It also shows 
that immediate compliance with the order was impossible, and that 
he did immediately comply, by taking nmasnres (,o pr(;j»are the road 
so that he could uuircli on it. 



41 

I therefore say tliiit lie gave iuiuiecliate iulelligeut coiupliauee with 
the order, and that this so-called delay was based on the best of 
jiidgiuent, and resulted favorably, while Reille's delay was unwar- 
ranted by the facts, and, if I am correct, in its eflfect on Ney it was 
the beginning of the events which changed Waterloo from victory 
to defeat; and since I have touched upon this matter, I will give 
the most noted instance I can recall of literal, instead of intelligent, 
obedience to the orders of a commanding general. 

XArOLEOX AND OHOUCHY. 

I select this because the superior genius of Napoleon so over- 
shadows all others that if any such case could arise this cei'tainly 
would be the one where a blind literal obedience of orders could be 
justified. Aftlie risk of being tedious, I will recite sufficient of the 
events which preceded June 18, 1815, to illustrate what I believe all 
will admit was the duty of Marshal Grouchy upon that eventful 
day. 

Napoleon lainled hi France March 1, 1815. He marched in triumph 
to Paris and asumed the government on March 13 ; he proceeded to 
establish his power at home ; to create armies and war material ; to 
restore the broken finances ; to re-establish so far as possible the diplo- 
matic relations. 

FOllCES AT WATEKLOO. 

On June 1, the allied armies menacing France were : 

Anslo-allied array, under Wellingtou 104, 710 

Prussian army, under Blncher 116, 897 

German corps d'armee, under Kleist 26, 200 

Army of the Upper Ebiue, under Schwartzenberg 254, 492 

Russian army, under Barclay de Tolly 167, 950 

A rray of Italy, under Frimont 60, 000 

Total allied armies in the field, June, 1815 730, 249 

Wellington was the recognized leader of the combined forces. 

Napoleon had not more than 200,000 men in all the armies of France. 

His forces were : 

Grand army, under the Emperor 116, 801 

Army of the Rhine, under Rapp 35, 000 

Army of the Alps, under Suchet 15, 000 

Army of the Jura, under Lecourbe 4, 500 

Army of the Var, under Brune 5, 300 

Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, under Decaen 3, 000 

Army of the Western P.^i'enees, under Clauzel 3, 000 

Army of La Vendee, under Laniaique 16, 000 

198, 601 



Apiil 1, Njntoleou's circular letter to the sovoreigus of Europe ap- 
pealiuj"' for peace, commenciug "Sire, my brother !" had been re- 
ceived, only to he iguored. 

There was uo way to defend but by attack, and the Emperor de- 
termined to fall upou the uearest advauce of the lueiiaciny armies, 
which were upou the Belgian frontier. 

He caused the election of deputies to the Chamber of Representa- 
tives. This body convened, and it was soon evident that there was 
not only a lukewarm support, but that there was an evident deter- 
mination to throw obstacles in the way of the Emperor's ambition. 

Ou June 11, Napoleon issued a moderate but earnest farewell ad- 
ilress to the deputies, appointed his brother Joseph president of a 
provisional goverument, before daylight ou the 12th left Paris, and 
on the 14th reached the theater of war in Belgium, making his 
first halt at Beaumont, about fifty-three miles from Brussels, the 
headquarters of Wellington, aiid about forty-two miles from Namur, 
where Blucher was located. Zieten's large corps was at Charleroi, 
but eighteen miles from Beaumont. 

When Napoleon arrived he found about 60,000 of his men in front 
of Beaumont about 14,000 to the right or southeast, and about 
40,000 on the Sambre to the left of Beaumont. 

Though ph.vsically indisposed. Napoleon directed in person the 
preparation for the movement of the several corps. By daylight on 
the loth. Prince Jerome struck the enemy's outpost at Thurin, and 
Genei'al Pajol, commanding the first corps of cavalry, fought for two 
miles, from Marchiennes to Charleroi. 

This point was thirty-five miles from Brussels, and twenty-four 
miles from Namur. Namur is thirty-five miles from Liege, where 
Bulow was located, and twenty miles from Ciney, the headquar- 
ters of Thielmanu. 

I will here give in detail the organization and strength of the two 
opposing armies : 

ALLIED ARMT UNDER THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 
First Corps. — The Prince of Orange. 

First Division, Major-General Cooke. 

Men. 

First British Brigade, Major-General Maitland 1, 997 

Second British Brigade. Major-General Sir Jolin Byng 2, 064 



4,061 
Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Adye. 



43 



Third Divisiox.—Lieutenant-Geueial Count Alte.n. 

Fifth British Brigade, Major-General Sir Colin H.ilkett . - .^ 2, 254 

Second Brigade, King's German Legion, Colonel von Ompteda ... 1. o2. 

First Hanoverian Brigade, Major-General Count Kielmansegge . . ._5a89 ^ ^^^ 

Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel WiUiamsou. 

SECOND DUTCH-BELGIAN DivisiON-Lieutenant-GeneralBAUOK de Peki-on- 

CHEK. 

First Bri<^ade, Major-General Count de Bylandt . - .^. - 3, 233 

£condBrig-le. H. S. H. Pnnce Bernhard, of Saxe-Weunar _4,^0 ,^^^ 

Artillery, Major von Opstal. 
THIRD DUTCH-BELGIAN DivisiON.-Lieutenant-General Baron Chasse. 

3 088 

First Brigade, Major.General Ditmers • ^^ 

Second Brigade, Major-General d' Aubreme - g_ gg^ 

Artillery, Major Van der Smissen. 

05 233 
Total First Corps, guns 48 ; men " • 

This corps was stationed as follows : 
Quatre Bras, Nivelles. 
Boeulx to Binche. 
Soignies to Roeulx, Braiue Enghien. 

Second Corps.— Lieutenant-Geueral Lord Hill. 
Second DivisiON.-Lieutenaut-General Sir H. Clinton. ^ ^^^ 

Tliird British Brigade, Major-General Adams -■-■-■■ "' -^g 

First Brigade Kings German Legion, Colonel du Plat - ^ 

Third Hanoverian Brigade, Colonel Hew Halkett _j 

6,837 
Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Gold. 

FOURTH Division. -Lientenant-General Charles Colville. 

Fourth British Brigade, Colonel Mitchell . - 1' ^J' 

Sixth British Brgade, Major-General Johnston^ ■ - -• 

Sixth Hanoverian Brigade, Maior-General Sir James Lyon S,^*^ ^ ^la 

Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker. 

FIRST DUTCH-BELGIAN DivisiON.-Lieutenant-General Stedman. 

First Brigade, Major-General Hauw | 6_ 389 

Second Brigade, Major-General Berens - 

Artillery. „ , , ^i • t 'SR'l 

Dutch-Belgian Indian Brigade, Lieutenant-Gene.al Anthmg- . ■---■■■-■■-■ -*• ^°^ 

Detachments, &c 

24,037 

Total Second Corps, guns 40 ; men \" V'r^ 4. t. 

This corps was stationed as follows: Ath, Gudenarde, road of Gramniont to 

Ghent, thence to Alost. 

RESERVE. 

FIFTH DivisiON.-Lieutenaut-General Sir Thomas Picton. 

Eighth British Brigade, Maj . Gen. Sir James Kempt 2, 471 

Ninth British Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sir Dennis Pack -- ^^^ 

Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, Colonel Von Vincke _j 

7,158 
Artillery, Major Heisse 



«4 



Sixth DivrfsioN. — Lieutfuant-Geiieial Hou. Sir L, Colk. 

Tenth JJiitish Brigade, Maj. Gcu. Sir Jolm Lambert 2, 367 

Fourtb Hauoveriaii Brijjade, Colonel Best 2, 582 

5, 149 

Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Bnickniauu. 
Bi-itisli Itesoi-ve Artillery, Major Drummond. 

Seventh Division. 

Seventh Britisli Brigade 1,210 

Britisli jiarrisou troojis 2. 017 

3, 233 

BituxswiCK Cours.— H. S. H. the Duke of Buixswick. 

Advanced guard, Major von Rauschenplat 672 

Light Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel von Buttler 2,688 

Line. Lieutenant-Colonel von Specht 2,016 

5, 376 

Artillery, Major Mahu. 

Hanoveuiax Eeseuve Coiii\s. Lieutenant-Colonel von der Deckex. 

First Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel von Beuningsen | 

Second Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel von Beaulieu ( 9 000 

Third Brigade. Lt. Col. von Bodekin ' 



Foui'th Brigaile, Lieutenant Colonel von Wissel 

Kassau Contingent, General von Kruse 2, 880 

Total reserve, guns 64 ; men 32, 796 

This cojps, together with the Brunswick Cavalry, was stationed around Bms- 
sels. 

Cavai-ky.— Lieutenant-General tlie Eaiii- of XTxhkidge, British and King's Ger- 
man Legion. 

First (household) Brigade, Maj. Gen. Lord E. Somer.set 1, 286 

Second (Union) Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sir W. Ponsonby 1, 181 

Third Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sir "W. Dornburg 1,268 

Fourth Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sir J. Vandeleur 1, 171 

Fifth Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sir C. Grant 1,336 

Sixth Brigade, Maj. Gen. Sii- H. Vivian 1,279 

Seventh Brigade, Col. Sir F. von Arentsschildt 1,012 

8, 473 
Six Briti.sh horse batteries attached to the cavalry. 

HANOVKitlAN. 

First Brigade, Colonel Von Estorft' 1,682 

Brunswick cavalrv !»22 

— 2,004 

DLXCH-BEUilAX. 

First Brigade, ilajor-General Trip 1, 237 

Second Brigade, Major-General De Cliigney 1, 086 

Third Brigade, Major-General Van Merlen 1, 082 

3, 40;') 

Artillery. 

Total cavalry, guns 44, men 14, 482 



45 

The luaiu body of tlie cavalry was at Grauuuout and Niuhove. 

Two brigades were tlirowu forward from Roenlx to Mons and oue 
brigade was still further thrown forward opposite to Maubenge and 
Beaumont. 

Abtii.leky. 

British, 10 loot batteries ; giuis, 54 ; men 3, 630 

British, 8 horse batteries ; gnns, 48 ; nieu 1, 400 

5,030 

King's German Legion, 1 foot battery ; guns, G ; men i 

King's Gennau Legion, 2 horse batteries : guns, 12 ; men 5 

Hanoverian, 2 foot batteries ; guns, 12 ; men 465 

Brunswick, 1 foot battery ; guns, 8 ; men i 

liruuswicli, 1 horse battery ; guns, 8 ; men 5 

Dutch-Belgian, 4 foot battery ; guns, 32 ; men 068 

l)utch-Belgiiin, 2 foot battery ; guns, 16 ; men 667 

1,635 

Total artillery guns, 196; men 8,166 

PRUSSIAN ARMY.— FIELD MARSHAL PRINGH BLVGHER TONWAHL- 
STABT. 

Fiitsi' Coups — Lieutenant-G-eneval von ZuiTEN', headiiixarters Charleroi. 

First Bi'igade, General von Stemmetz 8, 647 

Second Brigade, General von Pirch TI 7, 669 

Third Brigade, General von Jagow 6, 853 

Fourtli Brigade, General von Henkel 4, 721 

27, 887 
Reseuve Cavaluy — Lieutenant-General von Roukk. 

Brigade of General von Treskow 

Brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Lutzow 



1. 925 



REt^EUVE AuTH.i.EUY. — Colonel von Lehmanx. 

Eight foot batteries 

One howitzer J. 1,019 

Three horse 



] 



Total First Corps 30,831 

Second Coupjs. — General von Pirch, headquarters Namur. 

Fifth Brigade, General von Tippelskirchen 6, 851 

Sixth Brigade, General von Krafft 6, 469 

Seventh Brigade, (general von Brause 6, 224 

Eighth Brigade, Colonel von Langen 6, 292 

25, 836 
Reseuve Cavalry! — General von Juijgkass. 



Brigade of Colonel von Thnmen 

Brigadeof Colonel Count Schulenburg J. 4, 408 

Brigade of Colonel von Sohr 



\ 



^4() 

Keskkve Aktillkiiy — Coloiml vou IloiiL. 

Seven foot batteru'S i 

> 1 454 
Three horse butteries 5 ' 



Total Second Corps, guns, 80 ; men 31, 758 

TmitD Coups. — Lieutenant General von Thiei.manx, Headquarters, Ciney. 

Niutb Brigade, Geucral vou Borcke 6, 752 

Tenth Brigade, Colonel von Kumpfen 4, 045 

Eleventh Brigade, Colonel vou Luck 3, 634 

Twelfth Brijiade, Colonel von Stulpnagel 6, 180 

20, 611 
Eeseuve Cavalky. — General von Hohe. 

Brigade of Colouel von der Marwitz j 

/ 2 405 
Brigade of Colonel Count Lottoni 5 ' 

Eeseuve Autii.lehy.— Colonel von Mohnhaui'T. 

Three foot batteries > 

Three hoi'se batteries 5 



Total Third Corps, guns 48, men 23,980 

FouKTH Cours.— General Count Bulow von Denxewitz. Headquarters, Liege. 

Thirteenth Brigade, Lieutenant-General von Hacke 6, 385 

Fonrteentli Brigade. General von Ryssee 6, 953 

Fifteenth Brigade, General von Losthin 5, 8Sl 

Sixttrentli Brigade, Colonel von Hiller 6, 162 

25, 381 
Keseuve Cavalky.— General Prince William of Prus.sia. 

Brigade of General von Sydow 

Brigade of Colonel Count Schworin ^ 3, 081 

Brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel von Watzdorf 



EEtiEUVE AuTiLLKHY. — Lieutenant-Colouel von Baudeleukn. 
Eight foot batteries 



Jiignt toot batteries i 

Thr€«e horse batteries ) ' 

Total Fourtli Corps, guns 88 ; men 30, 328 

Orand total of allied army. 

Guns. 



British 23,543 5,913 .5,030 102 

King's German Legion 3,301 2,560 526 18 

Hanoverian , 22,788 1,682 465 12 

Brunswick ...J 5,376 922 510 16 

Nassau I 2,880 

Dutch-Belgian ' 24,174 3,405 1,635 48 

First Prussian Corps 27,817 1,925 1,019 96 

Second Prussian Corps 25,836 4,468 1,454 80 

Third Prussian Corps 20,611 2,405 904 48 

Fourth Prussian Corps i 25,381 3,081 1,866 88 

Total 181,777 26,361 13,469 508 



47 

SUMMARY. 

^ . , 181,777 

^"^^"/^■>' 26.361 

C*^?^'"^ 13,469 

Artillery 

221. 607 

NAPOLEON'S ARMY COMMANDED BT THE EMl'EKOli IN PERSON. 

Second in command, Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskowa. 

First Corps.— Lieutenant General Count D'Erlon. 

First Pivisiou, General Alix 

Second Division, General Don/.elot I 17^ gOO 

Third Division, General Marcognet -•■ 

Fourth Division, General Durutte -• 

First Cavalrv Division, Lieutenant-General Jaquinot 1. 400 

, ,.„ " 1,564 

Artillery 

Total First Corp.s, guns, 46; men 20,564 

Second Corps.— Lieutenant-General Count Keili.e. 

Fifth Division, General Bachelu | 

Sixth Division, Prince Jerome Napoleon v 19 435 

Seventh Division, General Giiard - | 

Ninth Division, General Foy -' 

Second Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Pir6 1. 868 

1, 861 

Total Second Corps, guns, 46; men 23,161 

Third Corps.— Lieutenant-General Count Vandamme. 

Tenth Division, General Hubert ^ 

Eleventh Division, General Barthezene ^ 13,200 

Eighth Division, General Lefol 

Third Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Domont 1. 400 

Artillery ^' -^'■ 

Total Third Corps, guns, 38; men 15,892 

Fourth Coups.— Lieutenant-General Count Ceuard. 

Twelfth Division, Lieutenant-General Pecheux ^ 

Thirteenth Division, Lieutenant-General Vichery ? 12, 100 

Fourteenth Division, General Hulot 

Sixth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Moriu 1. 400 

Artillery ^'^^" 

Total Foui th Corps, guns, 38 ; men 14, 792 

Sixth Corps.— Lieutenant-General Count Lohau. 

Nineteenth Division, Lieutenant-General Simmer > 

Twentieth Division, Lieutenant-General Jeannin ? 9. 900 

T wt^ntv-first Division, Lieutenant-General Teste 

1 000 
Artillery ^' 

Total Sixth Corps, guns. 38 ; men 11, 192 



IMI'EUIAL (tUAKU. — Coimnaiided by Miirslml Mohtiek.' 

Oltl (riiard, Lieiiteuant-Gcnoral Friant 4, 000 

Middle ( Uiard, Lieutenant-General Movaud 4, 000 

Vouug Guard, I^icutenaut-General Duliesnic 4, 000 

First Cavalry Division, General Guyot 2, ODD 

Second Caviilry Division, General Lefcbvre-De.suouettes 'i, 000 

Artillery, General Devaux , 2, 400 

Total Guard, guns, 96 ; men 18. 400 

RESEEYE CAYALTIY VNDER COMMAND OF MARSHAL COUNT BE 

GROUCHY. 
Yuisr Coups. — Lieuteuaut-Geueral Pajqi.. 

Fourth Cavalry Division, Licutenant-G eneral Soult » ^ . 

Fifth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-Genoral Subervie S "' " 

Artillery 300 

Skcond Coups. — Lieutenant-General Excelmans. 

Xiuih Cavalry Division, Lieutenaut-Geueral Strolz i 

Tenth Cavalry Division. Lieutenant-General Chastel 5 *' 

Artillery....! 300 

Tmui) Coups.— Lieiitenaut-Geueral Kei.lkumann. 

Eleventh Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General L'Heritier i 

Twelfth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Roussel > ' ' 

Artillery ' 300 

FouuTii Coups.- Lieutenant-General Miluauh. 

Thirteenth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-Genoral "Wathier i 

3 300 
Fourteenth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant-General Delort J ' 

Aitillery 300 

Total IJeserve Cavalry, guns 48 ,- men 12, 800 

Grand Total. 



Infantry, j Cavalry. Artillery, i Guns. 



First Corps d'Armee . . 
Second Corps d Arniee . 
Third Cor))s d'Armee .. 
Fourth Corps d'Annee . 
Sixth Cori)s d'Armee . . . 

Imperial Guard 

Reserve Cavalry , 



Total . 



17, 600 
19, 435 
13, 200 
12, 100 
9,900 
12, 000 



1,400 
1,865 
1,400 
1,400 



4,000 
11, 600 



1,564 
1,861 
1,292 
1,292 
1,292 
2,400 
1,200 



84, 235 



21, 665 



10, 901 



350 



Infantry 84, 235 

Cavalry 21,665 

Artillery 10,901 



116, 801 



'^Mortier stated he was ill on the 14th at Beaumont and retireil from eommand. 



49 

Napoleon also had a corps of engineers witli wagou-trains num- 
■bering about 5,000 men, whicli I do not include, nor have I included 
the engineers or wagon-trains of the allied array. 

I give the figures of Napoleon's force as stated by those who argue 
against him and in favor of Marshal Grouchy, aud who, as part of 
their argument, put Napoleon's forces as high as ijossible. 

I have given the names of his corps aud division commanders to 
show that but a small number of the greatest of his generals were with 
him. Very few of those leaders who had during his eighteen years 
of triumphs shared his world-wide renown, as participants in the 
victories he had won, were with him, and what was worse, nearly all 
his generals a year previous had left him with his fallen fortunes, 
aud given unqnalitied adhesion to the Bourbon dynasty, and but three 
months gone had turned from their Bourbon masters to bow again 
attlieslnine of the Imperial eagle, and undaunted genius of Napoleon. 

The organization of the several brigades and divisions was changed, 
the old regiments were reformed, old numbers replaced, and eagles, 
which recalled past glories, were restored. While these changes 
tended to enthuse the troops, their advantage was in a measure neu- 
tralized by their placing troops under new commanders, and to a con- 
siderable extent separating soldiers who had learned by experience 
to rely upon each other. 

These facts show that Wellington and Blncher had ample informa- 
tion regarding Napoleon's efforts. Surrounded by the embarrassments 
to which I have alluded, this great leader, on the 16th at the head 
of fi9,000 men, consisting of the Guards aud live corps, hurled him- 
self against the corjis of Zieten, Pirch, and Thielmann, in all, 8(3,560 
men, under Field Marshal Prince Blncher, and after aterrific engage- 
ment, which lasted from noon until dark, the Emperor gained a 
complete victory, driving him from the field of Ligny, and inflicting 
upon him a loss which Blncher reported at 3,507 killed and 8,571 
wounded, besides a great number of prisoners. At 2 o'clock the same 
day Marshal Ney, with 17,615 men, increased at 5 p. m. to 20,000, at- 
tacked the allied troops at Quatre Bras, on the road from Chaileroi 
to Brnssels, and by dark had won a victory, inflicting a loss on the 
enemy of 5,200 killed, wounded, and missing, and himself suflfering 
a loss of 4,140 killed and wounded. 
WH 4 



50 

Now, suppose Napoleon's loss in killed and wounded to have been 
equal to that of Blucber, then his army after the en<ra<i;enient would 
be 100,583, while Wellington and Blucher had 20:5,8i9. But every 
one who has had experience iu war knows that such conflict will 
reduce an army at least 10 per cent, in addition to casualties, 
caused by those who leave the field from fatigue, to care for the 
wounded, and from other less creditable reasons. 

Therefore, the next day, the force may be said to have been, 
Wellington's 183,447, Napoleon's 90,425. No one knew better than 
Grouchy the critical position of the French army, and the necessity 
for most prompt and intelligent obedience to orders. 

Even without orders he should have never ceased to press upon 
the retreating Prussians, at least he should have kept his advance 
within cannon range of their rear; but he attempts to justify this 
neglect by certain verbal orders which he says were given him by 
the Emperor, and which he contends were capable of being literally 
construed so as to justify his movements and marches with 34,000 men 
(more than one-third of Napoleon's force), and for half a century he 
has found those who sustain him. 

GROUCHY LOSES FOR NAPOLEON AN EMPIRE BY LITERALLY OBETINtt ORDERS. 

Now admit for Grouchy all he desires and the verbal order he re- 
ceives from Napoleon was : 

1 p. M., June 17. 

Pursue tlie Prussians ; complete their defeat by attackins thnm as soon as you 
come up with them, and never let thf ra out of your sight. I am going to unite the 
remainder of this poi'tion of the aimy with Miirslial Key's corps, to march 
against the English and to fight them if they should hold their ground lietween 
this and the forest of Sol-inies. You will communicate with me by the paved road 
which leads to Quatre Bras. 

Also Grouchy's friends allege that Napoleon said to him : 

The Prussians are put to rout, and are flying oq the road to N'amur and Liege. 

Also that Grouchy appealed to the Emperor to allow him to march 

to Quatre Bras, and that Napoleon replied: 

Marshal Grouchy: Proceed towards Namur, for according to all probability it 
is on the VIeuse that the Prussians are retiring. It is thea in this direction you 
will find them and that you ought to march. 

Grouchy himself says : 

The orders of Napoleon were, " Put yourself in pursuit of the Prussians, com- 
plete their defeat iu attacking thera as soon as you shall .join them, and never lose 
sight of them. I am going to reunite to the corps of Marshal Ney the troi.ps I 



51 

•carry with tne, to march upon the English and to fight them if they will stand this 
side of the forest of Soignies. Ton will correspond with me by the paved road 
which leads to Quatre Bras." I attest upon my honor that these were his owu 
expressions, that I received no other instructions. * * * 

Far from modifyiijig his first orders, the Emperor corroborated them, 

sayinj? : 

Marshal, make your way to Namur, for it is oii the Meiise that, according to all 
probability, the Prussians are retiring; it is therefore in this direction that you 
"will find them and in which you ougiit to march. 

Now Grouchy also justifies himself because ou June 17, Napoleon 

then en route to Quatre Bras, sent back a written order to Grouchy, 

which said : 

March to Gembloux ; you will explore in the direction of Ifamur and Maestricht, 
and you will pursue the enemy — 

And find out if the enemy are " separating from the English, or are 
bent ou uniting with them to save Brussels and try the fate of an- 
other battle." 

The order, it is claimed, was sent from Marbais, a little town half- 
way between Ligny and Quatre Bras, and Grouchy's friends also in- 
sist that when Napoleon sent the order he had information that the 
Prussians had passed Tilly, in the direct road to Wavre. 

The.se orders Marshal Groucliy claims are his justification for 
moving his army to Gembloux, aud a portion of it through and on 
to Sart-les-Walhaiu and Perwez, these movements extending into the 
night of the 17th, so that the rear did not reach Gembloux until as 
late as 10 p. m. 

The march was fortunately only about eight miles for the most 
of the infantry and about fifteen for the advanced cavalry, which 
camped on the night of the 17th at Perwez. 

After revolving these matters for four years, Marshal Grouchy pub- 
lished a work entitled " Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne 
de 1815, imbliee par le General Gourgaud ; et Refutation de Quelques- 
unes des Assertions d'Autres 6crits relatifs a la Bataille de Waterloo. 
Par le Comte de Grouchy. A Paris. 1819," in which he says [page 
12]: 

I told him [Napoleon], that theFrussians had commenced their retreat the even- 
ing before at 10 o'clock, and so forth. These observations were not well received. 
He repeated to me the order which he had given me, adding that it was for me 
to discover tlie route taken by Marshal Blucher; that he was going to fight the 
English ; that I ought to complete the defeat of the Prussians in attacking them as 



soon as I should have joined them ; and that I shouhl coi respond with him by the- 
paved road, which leads from a point near where we were to Quatie Bras. Some 
moments of conversation which I liad with the chief of staff [Soiilt] regarded only 
the detaching of certain of my troops wliich were to be sent to Quatre Bras. Such' 
are, word for word, the only dispositions which were communicated to me, the only 
orders which I received. 

Now take every a-ssuinptiou, just as Mar.shal Groucby's ex parte 
statement would have us believe, aud wbat is tbe attitude ? 

Six days before Napoleon was in Paris manipulating tbe wires of 
foreign aud domestic diplomacy, creating and organizing armies,, 
and in tbose six days be bad traveled 150 miles, bad conceived and 
partly executed a plan of campaign ; he had fought and defeated 
Blucber, and then relying upon bis generals to manage minor details,, 
be bad fallen exhausted, and was taking a little rest. 

Grouchy was tbe commander of four army corps of cavalry, each 
one of which had a lieutenant-general. 

No duty ever devolved on a general more imperative than now 
devolved upon Grouchy, and that duty was to press vigorously the 
rear-guard of each of Blucher's columns and dispatch Napoleon every 
hour of their location. 

Grouchy should have known every movement of the enemy, and,, 
in the very nature of military precedents, orders given to such a 
commander of cavalry would in all probability have been based upon, 
information given by him to the Emperor. 

If Napoleon gave any such orders as Grouchy alleges, it was 
Grouchy's fault and neglect that they were so given. 

The orders, if given at all, were given upon incorrect information 
as to the enemy's movements ; and Marshal Grouchy defends hia 
march toward Namttr and Li6ge solely upon tbe ground that he 
complied literally u'ith orders. 

We might have the miserable excuse for him that be did not know 
himself where the enemy was; but be deprives us of that by ad- 
mitting that he knew at 2 o'clock on the 17th that tbe Prussian 
troops had gone through Tilly to Wavre, and he admits, too, that 
this was discovered by the Emperor and communicated to him. But, 
says the marshal of France, I obeyed orders literally, and, although it 
cost an empire, I must be exonerated. 

Even upon Grouchy's own statement of the wording of the orders 
lie received, it is very clear that he did not comply with them in th& 
spirit intended by Napoleon. 



53 

This is eonclusively sbowu by the correspondence between Mar- 
shal Gr..ucby and the Emperor, most of which was not published 
until years after the events transpired. 

Before I read these letters, I want to call attention to the fact that 
Grouchy was in command of Napoleon's cavalry. It was his special 
duty to keep Napoleon informed regarding the position and move- 
ments of the enemy, and any orders given by Napoleon must have 
been based upon Grouchy's statements regarding Blucher's move- 
ments. 

I will first read an order written before Napoleon left Ligny for 

Quatre Bras. 

Ligny, June 17, 1815. 

March to Genibloux with I'ajol'a cavah-y- * * * You will explore in 
the direction of Naraur and Maesiricht, and you will pursue the enemy ; explore 
his march and instruct me as to his movements, so that I can find out what he is 
intending to do. I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre Bias, where the Eng- 
lish still were this morning. Our communication will then be direct, by the paved 
road of Nannir. If the enemy has evacuated Namur, write to the general com- 
manding tlie second military division at Charlemont to cause Namur to be occupied 
by some battalions of the National Guard and some batteries of cannon which he 
will oro-anize at Charlemont. He will give the command to some general officer. 

It in important to find out what Blueher and Wellington are intending to do, and 
if they purpone to reunite their armies to cover Brussels and Liege in trying the fate of 
a battle. In all cases, keep constantly your two corps of infantry united in a 
league of ground, having several avenues of retreat, and post detachments of 
oavalry intermediate between us, in order to communicate with headquarters. 

Dictated by the Emperor in the absence of the chief of staff. 

The Grand Marshal, BERTRAND. 

Marshal Grouchy replied to this order at 10 o'clock; I will give 
exact language. 

To do him no injustice, I will first give his letter in French, and 

then give what 1 think is a correct translation. 

Gembloux, le 17 Juin, k dix heures du soir. 

Sire : J'ai I'honneur de vous rendre 
compte que.j'orcupe Gembloux et que ma cavalerie est h, Sauveni6res. L'ennemi. 
fort d'environ trente niillc hommes, continue son mouvement de retraite; on lu 
a saisi ici un pare de 4i bett-s h cornes, des magasins et des bagages. 

II parait d'apifes tous les rapports, qii'aniv68 k Sauveni6ies, les Prussiens se 
8ont divises eii deux colonnos; I'une a dfi prendre la route de Wavre en passant 
par Sart-i-Wallain, I'autre cidoniie parrait s'otre dirig6e sur Perwes. 

On peut peutetie en iu(6ifr qii'une portion va joindre Wellington, et quo le 
centie, qui est raiiu6e de Blueher, se retire sur Li<^ge; une autre colonne avec de 
rartillerie ayant fait son mouvement de retraite par Namur, l6G6n6ralExcelman8 
a ordre de pousser ce boir six escadrous sur Sart-^-Wallain et trois escadrons sur 
Perwes. 

D'aprfes leur rapport, si la masse des Prussiens se retire sar "Wa^-re, je la sui- 



64 

A'rai flans cetto direction alin <|u i!s m- puisaent pas gafjnor Bruxelles, et de le* 
.s6paicr <l(i WcUinjitou. 

Si, an coutraire, nies rensi'igncnieus prouventquelaprincipale force Pru8sienn» 
a iuarch6 siir Perwea, je nic dirigeiai par cette ville a la poursnite de rennenii. 

Les G6ncraux Tliielrnan et Borstell faisaient partie de I'arinfie que Votro 
MajcAt6 a battue hier ; ils 6taieut encore ce matin h, 10 hoiires ici, et ont auuonc6 
que vingt niille bomraes des leurs avaient 6t6 mis bors de combat. 

Ila out deniande en paitant les distances de Wavre, Perwes, et Hannut. 

Blucber a ete bless6 16gei-eraent au bras, ce qui ne I'a pas empeche de coutinuer 
iVcomiiiaiidcr apres s"<'tre fait panser. 

H n' a point ])asse par Gembloux. 

Je suis avoc respect, de Votre Majeste, sire, lo lid61e sujet, 

Le Mar6cbal Comte DE GROUCHY. 

Gembloux, June 17, 10 p. ni. 

SlKE: I liave the honor to report to you tliat I occupy Gembloux and that my 
cavalry is at Sauvenieres. The enemy, about thirty tliou.sand strong, continue* 
its retreat. We have seized 400 head of cattle, some magazines, and baggage. 

It a]ipeais from all the reports that, arriving at Sauvenieres, the Prussians 
diviiied into two columns, one taking the route to Wavre, and passing by Sart-les. 
Walhain, the other seems directed upon Perwez. 

It may perhaps be inferred that one part is going to ,ioin Wellington, and that 
the center, which is Blucher's army, is retiring on Li6ge ; another column, with 
artillery haviog retreated by Namur, General Excelmans is ordered to push to-night 
six squadrons of cavalry on Sart les- Walhain and three squadrons on Pervvez. 
According to their repoit, if the mass of the Prussians retire on W*vre, I will follow 
in that direction to prevent their reachiug Brussels, and separate them from Wel- 
lington. If. on the contrary, informntiou .shows that the priiu^ipal Prussian force 
has marched on I'erwez, I shall pursue the enemy towards that town. 

The corps of Generals Tliielman and Borstell formed part of the army which 
your Majesty vanquished yesterday. They were still here this moniing at 10" 
o'clock, and announced that twenty thousand of their men were disabled. They 
inquired, on leaving, the (liHtauces of Wavre, Perwez, and Hannut. Blucber wa» 
.slightly wounded in the arm, which did not prevent his resuming command, after 
having his wound dressed. He did not pass through Gembloux. 
I am, respectfully, sire, your Majesty's faithful subject. 

Marshal Count DE GROUCHY. 

I uow read two letters from Napoleou whicli show clearly that the 
verbal iustructions, with which Grouchy seeks to screen his error^ 
were accompanied by other words, explanatory of them, and showing 
that the order was strictly in accordance with the military ])rinciples 
which should have been followed by Grouchy : 

En avant he la j'eumk de Caillou, 

Ic 18 Juin, 1815, a dix henres du matin. 
Monsieur le Makech al : The emperor has received your last report, dated f i oni^ 
Gembloux. 

You speak to His Majesty of only two Prussian columns which have passed at 

Sauvenieres and Sart-iV Walhain. Nevertheless, repoils say that a third column, 

which was a pretty strong one, has passed by Gerry and Gentennes, directed on. 

Wavre. 

The emperor instructs me to tell you that at this moment His Majesty is going. 



55 

to attack the English army, which has taken position at Waterloo, near the forest 
of Soignies. Thus His Majesty desiies that yoii will direct your iiioveiutnts on 
Wavre, in order to approacli us, to put your.self in the sphere [en rappart] of our 
operations, and keep up your conmiuuii atious with iis; pushing heloie > ou those 
troops of the Prussian army which h;ive taken tliis direction, and which may have 
stopped at Wavre, where you ou^ht to ariive as soon as possible. You will fol- 
low the enemy's columns, which are on your light, by some light troops, in order 
to observe their moveiments and pick up their stragglers. lustruct me imme- 
diately of your dispositions and of your march, as also iif the news which you have 
of the enemy, and do not neglect to keep up your communications with us. The 
Emperor desires to have news from you very often. 

The Marshal DUKE OF DALMATIA. 

18 Juni, une heureapr^s midi. 

Monsieur Le MARfiCHAL: Tou have written to the Emperor at three o'ch)ck 
this morning that you would march onSart-^-\Valh:iin ; your intention, tlien, is to 
goto Corbai.K and Wavre. This movement is conformable to His Majesty's arrange- 
ments which have been communicated to you. Nevertheless, the Euipeior orders 
me to tell you that you ought alwa.s s to manoeurer in our direction, and to seek to 
come near to our army, iu order that you may join us before any corps can put itself 
between us. I do not indicate to you tbe direction y<ui sin mid take ; it is for you to 
seethe place where we are, to govern yourself accordingly, and to connect our 
communication so as to be alway.s prepared to f .11 upon any of the enemy's troops 
which may endeavor to annoy our right, and to drstroy them. 

At this moment the battle is in piogress on the line of Waterloo, in front of the 
forest of ^oignies. The enemy's center is at Mont. 6t. Jean ; maneuver, therefoie, 
to join our right. 

The Marshal DUKE OF DALMATIA. 

P. S. — A letter which has just been intercepted says that Geneial Bl'ilow is 
about to attack our right flank ; we believe that wo see this corps on the height 
of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant in drawinu near us and joining us, in order 
to crush Biilow, whom you will take in the very act. 

The Marshal DUKE OF DALMATIA. 

It will be observed that Gioiicliy admits that at 1 p. m., June 17, 
Napoleon ordered him to 

Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you 
come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. 

Grouchy also admits that Napohon said: 

It was for me [Grouchy] to discover the route taken by Marshal Blucher; that 
he was going to fight the English : that I ought to complete the defeat of the Prus- 
sians in attacking them as soon as I should have joined them. 

He also admits that the order dated Lifjny, June 17, dictated by 
the Emperor and signed by Bertraud, said: 

Tou will pursite the enemy ; exi)lore his march, and instruct me aa to his move- 
ments, so that I can find out what he is intending to do. 

It is important to find out what Blucher and Wellington are intending to do. 



^0 

Now observe that Grouchey\s letter to the Emperor, written at 10 
o'clock that night, said. 
The Prussians divided iu two columns, one taking tbe route to Wavre. 

If the mass of the Prussians retire on Wavre, I will follow iu that direction. 

Also bear in niiud that at 10 o'clock ou the morning of the I8th 
Napoleon acknowledged the receipt of tills information, at the same 
time saying: 

A third column, which is a pretty strong one, has passed, directed on Wavre. 

This order also says : 

The Emperor iustrncts me to tell yon, that at this moment His Majesty is going 
to .attack the English army, which has taken position at Waterloo, near the for- 
est of Soignios. Thus His Majesty desires that you will direct your movements 
on Wavre, in order to approach iis. to ))ut yonrselt' in the sphere of our opera- 
tions. 

To show that Napoleon expected (irouchy to be close upon the 
Prnssians, reniemlier tliat the Emiteror's letter of 1 p. m., of the 
18th said : 

You ought always to uiaueuver iu our divectiou, and to seek to come near to 
our army in order that you may join us before any corps can put itself between 
ns. 

This letter also informed Grouchy that Biilow was about to attack 
Napoleon's right, and it closed with these words : 

We believe we see his corps on the heights of Saint Lambert. So lose not an in- 
stant in drawing near us, and joining us, in order to crush BUlow, whom you will 
take in the very act. 

It does not matter whether we take what Grouchy claims to be his 
verbal orders, or the authenticated official letters of instruction. In 
either case it is clear that he did not give an intelligent obedience 
to Napoleon's directions, although he did comply with the literal 
language of certain phrases that the order contained. 

It might be interesting to proceed with an account of the sublime 
heroism which Napoleon instilled into his soldiers and which they 
evinced on June 18 in their attack upon Wellington, and in resisting 
the assaults of Blucher upon their right flank and rear. But I have 
no heart to discuss an engagement which, with all its brilliancy of 
conception and courage and intrepidity of execution, was lost by the 
misjudged action of a man who owed his rank and honors to the im- 
perial leader whose fame and power ceased to exist when the charge 



57 

of the imperial guard of France was checlied, and they were com- 
pelled to recoil from a carnage too bloody for humanity to endure. 
It is painful to go farther. The battle of Waterloo was lost when 
Grouchy failed to intelligently complj'^ with the Emperor's orders ; 
and no heroism could have compensated for the great disparity of 
numbers which existed between the contending armies. 

Bogging the House to excuse my long digression for the purpose of 
illustration, I now return to the subjects, leaving the events of June 
IH, 1815, to consider those of 

AUGUST 29, 1862. 

General Logan now admits that Longstreet was on Jackson's right, 
but he insists that Porter ought to have complied with the literal 
language of one phrase of the 4.30 order, although by doing so he 
would have been drawn away from Pope, which would have caused 
bim to disobey three other phrases that the order contained. 

This is precisely the waythat Grouchy justifies himself in disobey- 
ing the order toappro^ch Napoleon, and to put himself in the sphere 
of Napoleon's operations, and to draw near to Napoleon " before any 
<5orps of the enemy can put himself between us" — that is, between 
Napoleon and Grouchy. 

Does not this illustrate that corps commanders must use discre- 
tion, and that they must obey orders so as to successfully carry out 
the purposes of the commanding general? 

I will place in the record a map illustrating the relative location 
of the places I have mentioned. 

PUNISHMENTS FOK INSUBORDINATION. 

The course pursued towards subordinates by nations and com- 
manding generals who have sustained reverses has varied greatly. 
Passion and not reason has often guided their acticw, and when sov- 
ereigns and geneialsof armies have found themselves involved in 
difficulties by reason of their own derelictions and false movements, 
they often attemi)t to shift censures and fasten responsibilities upon 
subordinates, and in these efforts they have too frequently allowed a 
mean and desj)icable selfishness to control their actions, regardless of 
the better dictates of the heart. 

Many cases have arisen where rulers have sought to inflict punish- 
iiK II r tor example's sake, and where packed courts have been used for 



58 

the purpose of bramliug stigimis upou risiug men, whose talent and 
courage were making tbem so prominent and popular as to create 
jealousies -which developed into envy, hatred, and malice. Thia 
spirit is not confined to rulers and to persons in high places alone. It 
develops itself in all circles of society, and in all the seasons of life. 
Some children, with more of pleasure than pain, cause the infliction 
of punishments upon their fellows, their schoolmates, and even upon 
their brothers and sisters, by withholding truth, and sometimes by 
wicked falsehoods. This inclination grows with the growth, and, as 
"the child is father to the man," it hardens and matures itself into 
cold and deliberate cruelty, so that commanders arefoiivd to create 
courts for some particular and selfish end, to construct them of trucu- 
lent officers to be swayed too often by perjury. I desire to say, 
before proceeding, that I do not apply these terras to the Porter 
court. The primary evidence as to the location of the confederate 
army was not placed before it, the most competent witness to tes- 
tify on these points being cut ofl^' by the line of battle that divided 
the contending armies of what were then two separate nationalities. 

SOME CUKIOL'S FACTS AS TO THE CONSTRUCTION AND CONDUCT OF THE COUItT. 

In connection, however, with this observation of mine, as to the 
Porter court-martial, I feel it my duty to call attention to this extra- 
ordinary statement of facts, as they exist, not only as to the organ- 
ization of the court, but as to a part of its conduct in the course of 
the investigation : 

It is now known that the movements of two divisions of General McDowell's 
corps gave up the key to the situation by their movements on August 26. I refer 
to the divisions of King and Eicketts — t'le former by his witlidrawal from Gaines- 
ville and the latter by falling back from Thoroughfare Gap. It is to thene two 
movements more than to anything that Porter did, or failed to do, that caused 
Pope's defeat on the SCth, and yettheotficei s who commanded those divisions were 
members of the court that tried Porter, in which either may have had th(^ casting 
vote. Furthermore, General King Wiis called by the Government as a witness to 
help make out the case for the prosecution, while he was a member of the court en- 
gaged in trying Poiter. Can anything be more monstrous than such a proci-editig 
in a court pretending to administer justice ? When the record fiist disclosed this 
fact to me I thought there must bo some mistake as to the identity as to othcers 
mentioned. I knew that the enemies of Porter were powerful and unscrupulous, 
but I was not prepared to tind that they had gone to the length of tr\ inp him be- 
fore their own prosecuting witnesses.— Colonel Moulton's letter to General Gibbons. 

The facts here stated have become historical, and it may be de- 
clared to the world, that in this great case of the trial of Fitz-John 



59 

Porter for his life, as a coward, some of his accusers were his judges^ 
nay, more — some of his judges were officers whose military movements 
had brought about the very mischief for which he was hy them con- 
demued! ! And one of these was produced as a wituess against him 
at the trial, and having testified as such, witness, gravely resumed 
his place on the board as a judge! 

THE IMPATIENT JUDGES. 

Another thiug is disclosed in the conduct of this Porter court- 
martial. They were in haste to get out of the, judicial harness. They 
were needed in other quarters, and for other purposes. 

It is a matter of record in the proceedings (see pages 218 and 219) that when the 
case was ch)8ed and the accused read his defense, that the judge-advocaie declined 
to reply, stating : To prepare a written reply, in keeping with th };ravity of the 
proceedings to the argument of the accused, would require several days, thus in- 
volving a delay which it is most important to avoid. Prom the consideration and 
from the urgent demand which exists for the services of members of this court in 
other and more active fields of duty, it is felt that the public interests will be best 
subserved by asking, as I now do, that you w ill proceed at once to deliberate upon 
and determine the issues which are before you. 

Now, Mr. Speaker, a judge who has in his hands the life of a human 
being 

IS NOT PEIIMITTED TO BE IN A HUKUY. 

He may grow weary under long and laborious toil in listening to evi- 
dence and in examining facts, but when he reaches the solemn mo- 
ment of judgment he must deliberate unembarrassed by the hurly 
burly of the outside world, and not allow himself to be led away by 
any extraneous matters. But in this case, involving the life and 
honor of this distinguished American general, the judge-advocate 
gravely says to the court : 

To prepare a written reply in keeping with the gravity of the proceedings to the 
argument of the accused would require several days, thus involving a delay 
which it is most imiiortant to avoid. 

And again this same judge-advocate, after thus acknowledging 
the gravity of the proceedings, perhaps shaking his finger at the 
court, makes this further impressive observation : 

From the urgent demand which exists for the services of members of thi» 
court in other and more active fields of duty, it is felt that the public interests 
will be better subserved, by asking, as I now do, that you will proceed at once to 
deliberate upon and determine the issues which are now before you. 

Mr. Speaker, I have a faint recollection of a sarcastic line of En- 
glish poetry, something like this : 

But men must hang, that jurymen may dine. 



A stroke of .satire leveled at the proverbial impatience of English 
juries. 

I do believe the day will come when some American Juvenal will 
Arise who will tind in the history of the trial of Fitz-John Porter 
abundant materials for a scorchinj; song, and I eainestly ho])e that 
be may take advantage of the occasion to lash all 

IMPATIENT JUDGES. 

whether found on the bench, on the wool-sack, or on the drum- 
bead. 

JUDICIAL HASTE AN ELEMENT OK TYRANNY. 

That voracious judicial vulture, Lord Jeftreys, was always in a 
■hurry. When he convened his grand jury at Bristol, in his bloody 
tidings ill England, so memorable in the judicial history of that 
country, he glared and stormed at the jvry, and exclaimed : " / am 
■here to do the Kbufs business." Everybody knew what that meaut. 
He had come to repeat his sanguinary role — to hang fifty men a day! 

It is fair evidence of haste in a judge to hang fifty men in a day. It 
would seem that at that time men were merely cattle in England. 
But they are not so considered in America. Heie, the life of an 
individual, however humble, can be taken by a court only after the 
most solemn consideration. Here, too, we pretend that 

HONOR IS DEARER THAN LIFE. 

Certainly, to a soldier whose dream is of glory, honor is dearer than 
life. 

Certainly, to a comiuanding general of an army corps, whose plume 
is already glittering with the rays of glory, won on the fields of bat- 
tle in the service of his country, honor is dearer than life. 

Certainly, to Fitz-John Porter, as he stood that day before that 
court-martial — having uttered a defense which put that staggered 
judge-advocate to the heavy task of several days' /a&or to answer — cer- 
tainly to him, honor was dearer than life. 

NEVERTHELESS, 

as it appears from the facts above referred to, that very court- 
martial had not time to give to that defense the consideration that its 
gravity demanded, for the court was advised, and, as it appeared, 
acted upon the advice, " to come at once to a determination of the 
matters before it." 



61 

The writer of the Tribune article does not, however, appear to- 
entertain my idea of the official integrity of officers of the Army, as; 
is shown by his thrust at Generals Terry and Getty, in his statement 
that Terry was Pope's competitor for the anticipated vacancy among 
the major-generals, and that Getty was an applicant for promotion 
to brigadier-general. 

I regret that he made the allusion, as I feel he did both these 
officers great injustice; but it is not surprising that, in the study of 
a case which shows the use of so much selfishness, treachery, and per- 
fidy to destroy Porter, he would be led to believe that integrity and 
honor had become in a measure supplanted by the baser instincts of 
humanity. 

This yielding to popular passion is no new phase in the history of 
men. 

The cry of 

Crncify him ! crucify him ! 
by the raging multitude could not be resisted by Pontius Pilate 
The trial and acquittal of our Saviour had taken place. The ver- 
dict was : 

I have examined him before you and find no canse in this man touching those 
things wherein you accuse him. No, nor Herod neither. 

Subservience to those who dispense office was at that time not un- 
like it is to-day, and all hesitancy ceased when he heard the threat: 

If thou release this man thou art not Coesar' s friend, 
and this judge and ruler, giving him over to death, satisfied himself 
with the pusillanimous expression: 

I am innocent of the blood of this just man. 

Magistrates and judges of all times, including those of to-day, are 
so disposed to yield to the clamor of popular fury that in all States 
and all nations it has been found necessary to incorporate in written 
statutes provisions for removing trials from the scene of excitement 
and prejudice. 

If such a law had existed in 1865, the records of our country 
would not show that 

IN A PKKIOD OF EXCITEMENT MRS. SUERATT WAS TRIED, 

Bentenred, and executed on the charge of harboring her son, who was 
charged with a crime of which, upon his subsequent trial, he was 



acquitted. It requii-es no argument to demonstrate that tlie mother 
could not have possibly been guilty of crime in harboring her son, 
when the facts finally showed that the son himself was not guilty. 

MILITARY DISCIPLINE AMONGST THE ItOMANS. 

No nation ever exercised military subordination more rigidly than 
the Romans. Their armies were models of discipline in the most 
enlarged sense of that phrase. But military punishments were en- 
forced with the greatest caution, and, excepting a few rare instances, 
with humanity. The Romans are known, in one instance at least, to 
liave rewarded with honors and congratulations the greatest military 
blunder ever perhaps committed by any of their generals. When 
Tarro fought and lost that most disastrous battle of Can*, in which 
lie displayed the greatest want of capacity and evinced the utmost 
ignorance of milita.ry affairs, the magnanimous people of Rome went 
out to meet him, upon his return to the city after the disaster, and 
warmly congratulaied him "that he had not despaired of the Repub- 
lic." Why was this? Simply because they knew that Varre was 
honest and patriotic, and that what he had done was done through 
ignorance, untainted by a corrupt intention. 

On this subject a very learned and distinguished writer on the his- 
tory of the wars and customs of the Romans gives us tliis enlightened 
chapter on that phase of Roman heroism : 

The Komans were not only less ungrateful than other republics, but were also 
more lenient and considerate in the punishment of the generals of their armies. 
For if their misconduct was intentional, ihey punished them humanely ; and if it 
was caused by ignoiance, they not only did not punisn them, but rewarded and 
honored them nevertheless. This mode of proceeding had been well considered 
by them ; for they judged that it was of the greatest importance for those whocom- 
manded their armies to have their minds entirely free and unembarrassed by any 
anxiety other than Iidw best to perform their duty, and, therefore, they did not 
wish to add fresh difficulties and dangers to a task, in itself so ditficult and peril- 
ous, being convinced that, if this were done, it would prevent any general from 
operating vigorously. Suppo,se, for instance, that they had sent an army into 
Greece against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against such tribes as had at first 
gained soine victories over them. Now, the commander of such an expedition 
would naturally feel the weight of all the cares attendant on such enterprises, 
and which are very great. But if in addition to these anxieties the mind of the 
general had been disturbed by the examples of other generals, who had been cruci- 
fied or otherwise put to death for having lost battles, it would have been impossi- 
ble for him, under the influence of such apprehensions, to have proceeded vigor- 
ously. Judging, therefore, that the ignominy of defeat would be sutficient punish- 
ment for such a commander, they did not wish to terrify him with other penalties. 
The following is an instance of how they punished intentional faults: 
"■Sergiusand Virginius were encamped before Veii, each commanding a sepa- 



63 

rate division of the army, Serjiins beinjr placed on the side where tlie Tuscans 
could make an attack, and Virjrinius on the opposite side. It happened that Ser- 
gius beinfj attacked by the Faliscans and other tribes, he preferred being beaten 
by them and put to fli^lit rather than apply to Virginius for assistance; and on 
the other hand, Virginius, waiting for his colleague to humble himself, was will- 
ing rather to see his country dishonored and the army of Sergius routed than 
march unsolicited to his succor. Certainly a very bad case and worthy of note, 
and well calculated to cause unfavorable conjectures as to the Koman Republic, if 
both these geneials had not been punished. It is true that whilst any other re- 
public would have inflicted capital punishment upon them, they were subjected 
by Rome only to a pecuniary fine. Not but what their misconduct merited se- 
'verer punishment, but because the Romans, for the reasons above explained, 
would not vary from their established custom." — Machiavelli. 

But the Roman generals-iii-cliief, and the Roiuau cousiils aud dic- 
tators were uot always so generous or so lenient as tbo Roman people. 
The rigid sternness of some of these military-civic superiors led to 
the conniiission of acts the most savage and revolting, one of which 
I shall here notice: 

HOW TOUQUATUS MANLIUS EXECUTES HIS SON. 

In the war between the Romans and the Latins the consuls issued 
orders that "no person should /(/7(f with any of the enemy, except in his 
post." 

It happened that among the other commanders of the troops of horsemen which 
were dispatched to every quarter to procure intelligence, Titus Manliics, the con- 
sul's s(m, came with his troop to the back of the enemy's camp, so near as to be 
scarcely distant a dart's throw from the next post, where some horsemen of Tus- 
culum were stationed under the command of Geminius Metrius, a man highly dis- 
tinguished among his countrymen, both by his birth and conduct. On observing 
the Roman horsemen, and the consul's son, remarkable above the rest, marching 
at their head (for they were all known to each other, particularly men of any note), 
he called out, "Romans, do ye intend," with one troop, to wage war against the 
Latins "and their allies ? What employment will the two consuls and their armies 
have in the mean time ? " Manlius answered: "They will come in due season, and 
with them will come one whose power and strength is superior to either — Jupiter 
himself, the witness of those treaties which ye have violated. If at the lake of 
Regillus we gave you fighting until ye were weary, I will answer for it that we 
shall in this place also give you such entertainment that for the future it will not 
be extremely agreeable to you to face us in the field." To this Geminius, advanc- 
ing little from his men, replied: "Do you choose, then, untilthatday arrives when 
with such great labor ye move your armies, to enter the lists yourself with me, 
that from the event of a combat between us two it may immediately be seen how 
much a Latin horseman surpasses a Roman ? " Either anger or shame of de- 
clining the contest or the irresistible power of destiny urged on the daring spirit of 
the youth, so that, disregarding his father's commands and the edict of the consuls, 
be rushed precipitately to a contest in which, whether he was victorious or van- 
quished, was of no great consequence to himself. The other horsemen removed to 
;some distance as if to behold a show. 



THE DUEL EXSLKI) AND YOlJ\G MAXLlrs Tltl LMl'116. 

Then, oollectinp; the spoils, lie rode back to his men, au»l together with his 
troop, who exalted with joy, proceeded to the camp, and so on to liis father, wil fa- 
out ever retiec tinj; on the nature or the consequences of his conduct, or whether 
he had merited praise or punishment. "Father," said he, "that all men may 
justly attribute to me the honor of being descended of your blood, having been 
challenged to combat, I bring these equestrian spoils, taken from my antagonist, 
whom I slew;" which, when the consul heard, tnining away iiistaiitlv from the 
youth, in an angry manner, he ordered an assemldy to be called, by soniid of 
trumpet, and when the troops had come together iu full numbers, ho spoke in this 
manner: 

"Titus Manlius, forasmuch as you, in contempt of the consular authority, and 
of the respect due to a father, have, contrary to our edict, fought with the enemy, 
out of your post ; and, as far as in you lay, subverted the milit iry discipline by 
which the power of Rome has to this day been supported, and have brought m& 
under the hard necessity either of overlooking the interests of the public or my 
own and those of my nearest connections, it is titter that we undergo the pen dty 
of our own transgressions than that the commonwealth should expiateourotfeuse,. 
80 injurious to it. We shall atford a melancholy exarajde, but a profttablo one, to 
the yt)uth of all future ages. For my part, I owu, both the natural affection of a 
parent and the instance which you have shown of bravery, misguided by a false 
notion of honor, affect me deeply. But since the authority of a consul's orders must 
either be established by your death or, by your escaping with impunity, be an- 
nulled forever, I expect that even you yourself, if you have any of our bhmd in 
you, will not refuse to restore by your puuishment that military discipline which 
has been subverted by your fault. Go, lictou; binii hi.m to the stake!" 
Shocked to the last degree at such a cruel order, each looking on the ax as if drawn 
against himself, all were quiet, through fear rather than discipline. They stood, 
therefore, for some time motionless and silent; but when the blood spouted from 
his severed neck. then, their minds emerging, as it were, from tlie stvipefactinn in 
which they had been plunged, they all at once united their voices in free exprrssious- 
of compassion, refraining not either froiu lamentations or execrations ; and cover- 
ing the body of the youth with the spiiils, theyburned iton a pile, erected without 
the rampart, with every honor which the warm zeal of the soldiers could bestow 
on a funeral. From thence "Manlian orders" were not only then considered with 
horror, but have been transmitted as a model of austerity to future times. 

It slioiiUl be here observed tliat upon the successful closing of this 
war, ■when Torquatus Manlius returned to Rome, that only the aged 
people went out to meet him, the young refusing to join in doing hitn 
honor, and ever after continued to execrate and curse Mm. Pliilo.sophers 
and historians, in succeeding ages, have been found to couiincnd this 
conduct of Torquatus Manlius. For myself, I have no hesitation in 
expressing my intense aversion to the act. It was atrocious, because 
it was unnecessary; it was cruel, because it was unnatural ; it was 
tyrannical, because it exercised paternal authority in conjunction 
with military power; and it was hypocritical and mean, because it 
was a strained effort to distort the heart and to substitute Romanista 
(so called) for luimauity, and thus to contribute to the personal re- 



G.5 

nowii of the imperious parricide. I would rather a tliousaud times be 
the young Manlius dead than the old Manlius liviug. From tills 
tragic pictui-e of horrid war I turn for relief to the contemplation of 
another, wherein I behold the grandest of all the monarchs of this 
earth, the illustrious David, the God-appointed King of Israel, la- 
menting over the dead body of his erring son Absalom. Absalom had 
rebelled and waged war against his father, and was slain, as a con- 
sequence of that war. Nevertheless, the heart-stricken, good old 
monarch, precipitated by natural emotions, falls into the moist violent 
lamentations, seeing nothing before him but the breathless beauty of 
a darling son, whose grievous sins were all forgotten in the agony ot 
a father's grief. 

In the one picture I see humauity deforuied by the god of war into 
a demon; in the other, I see humauity in its godliest aspect, .assert - 
ing Christianity a thousand years before its advent into this world. 
This stupendous parricide of Torquatus was 

PROMl'TED BY MILITARY AMIIITION. 

The love of personal renown had crushed out all the other loves iu 
that man's heart. The long contemplation of war and blood had 
made of him a brute. Personal glory had become his god, and the 
god of personal glory is a demon. 

The same awful mischief which military ambition perpetrated iu 
this particular case, envy and jealousy have perpetrated in a thou- 
sand others. Between the chief and subordinate commanders of the 
Roman armies, in all the ages of the kiugdom, the republic, and the 
emi^ire, there 

EVEK EXISTED A PERVADING PERSONAL JEALOUSY. 

The chief would not allow his lieutenants to tight in his absence, 
because a victory might have redounded to the glory of the lieuten- 
ant, thus stripping the chief of so much coveted renown. This jeal- 
ousy, however applicable to the earlier chieftains in the Roman 
wars, became especially conspicuous in the days of Marius, Sylla, 
Ciesar, and Pompey. Perhaps the solitary exception to this remark 
is found in the person of Cinclnuatus, for the simple reason that he 
did not allow glory and ambition to play their vicious roles in his 
immortal career. 
WH 5 



#^6 

AXOTllEU CASK OF UOMAN KKKOCITY. 

In coniiectiou with the foregoing reflections I give a brief account 
of another leading case of the furious determination of a Roman dic- 
tator to punisli a lieutenant who had fought agaimt orders. 

THE CASE OF QUINTIUS FABIUS. 

In the war with the Samnites, Cursor, the dictator, having occasion to go to 
Home, left strict orders with the master of tlie horse to remain in his post, and 
not to engage in hattle during his absence. After the deviarturo of the dictator, 
Fabius, having discovered by his scouts that the enemy were in as unguarded a 
state as if there was not a single Roman in their neighborhood, the high-spirited 
youth (either conceiving indignation at the sole authority in every point appear- 
ing to be lodged in the hands of the dictator, or induced by the opportunity of 
striking an important blow), having made the necessary preparations and disposi- 
tions, marched to a place called Imbrinium, and there fought a battle with the 
Samnites. His success in the fight was such that there was no one circumstance 
which could have been improved to more advantage if the dictator had been 
present. 

The fight resulted in a splendid victory for Fahius, and the slaughter 
of 20,000 of the enemy, and had been fought upon the discovery of a 
certain feeble situation and condition of the enemy whi(!h had been 
developed after the dictator had left, and which authorized and called 
for a fight ; a general of our day, refusiug to take advantage of such 
a situation, would be covered with merited disgrace. 

Now, when the dictator heard of this victory he flew into the 
greatest rage, for he considered that ho had lost just so much renoivn 
as Fahius had achieved for himself. He hastened back to the army 
and placed Fabius in the hands of the lictor, and was about to in- 
flict upon him the penalty of death, when the oft'euding officer fl.ed 
from the camp to Rome, aud appealed for protection to the senate and 
to the people. But the raging dictator followed him to the senate 
and was inexorable, though the senate and people with great unanim- 
ity interceded for Fabius. 

In this famous controversy the dictator planted himself upon the 
l>recedent which Torquatus had made in the slaughter of his son, 
and insisted that the splendor of the victory was no otfset to the 
breach of Roman discipline. His arguments and iuvincible resolu- 
tion prevailed, and Fabius was forced to submit on his knees to the 
inexorable will of the dictator. But seeing that all the people and 
the seuate of Rome were undisguisedly on the side of the young 
hero, the dictator so far relented as to grant Fabius his life, assert- 
ing to the last that the public submission of Fabius had re-estab- 



67 

lished tlie Manlian edict, and that his pardon was dictatorial mercy, 
persuaded hy the prayers of the people. 

POLITICAL JEALOUSIES AND ASPIRATIONS. 

Another peculiarity cropped out in the Roman wars — political am- 
l)ition built upon military success. Marius, by all odds the greatest 
man of his day, was early penetrated with a desire to achieve mili- 
tary renown as a foundation of civil power at Rome. He succeeded. 
Sylla, his lieutenant, followed in his footsteps. Having supplanted 
Marius to a certain extent in war ( for i t was Sy Ua's strategy that closed 
the Numidian war by the perfidious captuie of Jugurtha), Sylla re- 
solved to supplant Marius at Rome in civil authority. Hence the 
stupendous civil wars between Marius and Sylla, which were the be- 
ginning of the end of the grand old Roman nation. 

In these wars, growing out of political jealousies, every man fell 
who was in the way of the rising of either of these bloody aspirants. 
To suspect a subaltern was to execute him, if 

THE EXIGENCIES AlITHOKIZEU THE SACRIFICE. 

Now, it is quite evident that this political ambition which so en- 
grossed the old Romans is a prominent feature at this day in American 
politics. 

War made George "Washington President of the United States, so 
it made Andrew Jackson, so it made Harrison, and Taylor, and Grant. 
This war element had its influence in making Pierce President ; so 
also it extended into the election of Hayes and Garfield ; each had 
been military men with more or less renown. This element extended 
also into the nomination of General Hancock ; and it is well known 
that it was the mythical idea that Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky 
had killed Tecumseh that made Johnson Vice-President. 

This spirit is especially recognizable as a part of American politics^ 
from the persistence with which General Scott's friends pressed him 
for President, without a record excepting his military renown. Now, 
Mr. Speaker, I really doubt, and I express it here freely in my place, 
whether there were many successful generals in our late terrific war 
who did not feel in their captivated ears at some exquisite moment 
of sweeping triumph the unutterably harmonious humming of that 
inevitable bird, better known as the ^'Presidential bee." 

The use of these observations in this place is sim^ily to give me the 



t 



liberty of suggesting tliat in the sacrifice of FitzJolm Porter by 
that cruel conrt-martial the evil spirit of military and ])oiitical jeal- 
ousy and ambition entered fearfully and most eftectnally. 

THE TKUE ENDS OF PAHTY ORGANIZATIONS. 

Is this House now willing to make apolitical matter of this ques- 
tion? 

The legitimate ends of political parties are the urging and establish- 
ing of great principles; the means of preserving the free institutions 
of one's country ; of promoting the prosperity of the people, and 
working for the amelioration of mankind ; to find the best means to 
protect personal liberty and private proj>erty ; to bring about the 
greatest good to the greatest number, and to throw around the citi- 
zen an a^gis broad enough to shield him, not only in the enjoyment 
of property and liberty, but to guard and defend his honor; these 
are the ends of party, and in this view of it I too am a party man. 
But rather than carry my partisan feelings into a contest which in- 
volves the honor of a gallant soldier, who had fought bravely for 
his country in the face of danger and death, I would see my right 
arm severed from my body. 

If you are disposed to make this a party question, remember two 
things : 

1. It was under Republican rule that this great wrong was com- 
mitted. 

2. A Kepublicau Congress has the power to undo this mischief, and 
refuses the last opportunity to relieve its partj- from the obloquy of 
having done a great wrong. 

GENEUAL GUANTS MAGNANIMITY. 

On this very subject, in this very case, you have before you a 
splendid example in your own gallant and honored leader. General 
Grant. With a magnanimity that does honor not only to him but 
to the whole human race, his mind being disabused of error and 
prejudice by the revelations of the truth of history, he rises supe- 
rior to party, and asserts the grandeur of a real heroic nature in pro- 
claiming to the world not only his own grave error, but he publicly 
expresses genuine and honorable and manly grief for the mischief 
he has done this injured man by having refused to undo the greater 
mischief which had been done to him by this cruel court-martial ;. 



63 

lamenting that when he had the power to undo the mischief, his 
mind labored under the belief of this man's guilt upon a false theory 
and a fatal delnsiou. 

As much honor as General Grant has won in the service of his 
country, his glittering plume is yet brightened in its gleamings by 
this other ray of glory, coming, not from a victory on the field of 
battle, but from that greater victory over self, over party, and over 
prejudice. 

Every point now and heretofore claimed by Fitz-John Porter to prove 
his innocence of all wrong, intentional or otherwise, under the charges 
on which he was tried, is 

FULLY ESTABLISHED IN THE ORIGINAL RECORD 

of the court-martial, printed and shown in his defense at the time. 

The subsequently presented newly discovered evidence confirms the 
original testimony given in his behalf, and disproves that of his ac- 
cusers and prosecutors. 

Owing to circumstances best known to the court, the evidence in his 
defense was not credited, while that of the prosecution, now fully dis- 
proved, was received as correct. 

Most of the new evidence was documentary and written on the ground 
■during the events inquired into. 

The War Department exercised an espionage over all of Porter's cor- 
respondence, and he complained to the court that letters to him from 
the Army were withheld and pilfered. 

Complaint was made and made again to the Post-Office Department; 
but it was months before he received even a portion of the abstracted 
and withheld documents, which when presented with other evidence 
•confirmed the old testimony and 

ESTABLISHED HIS INNOCENCE 

■on all points. Other documentary evidence was withheld or mislaid by 
his accusers; some of this has not come to light, though its tenor is 
known. Other papers proving essential facts asserted by him but de- 
nied by his prosecutors were brought forward in 1878, by one of his 
accusers, from the secret recesses in which they had been held since 
1862 — brought out to prove a ' ' point ' ' in favor of the accusing witness, 
and they proved Porter's entire innocence of one of the gravest charges, 
and would have done so in 1862, when they were asked for. I refer to 



m 



Porter's letter, which showed that he received the 4.30 order after ft 
o'clock, and which had been in General McDowell's possession for six- 
teen years. 

The minority report of the Senate, submitted by Senator Logan on 
May 31, 1882, as if feeling the necessity of asserting a full and Jair 
trial, says that for forty-live days the court-martial was in session and 
that after a "patient investigation," during which many witnesses 
were examined. Porter was found guily. Nothing, however, is said of 
the fact that only thirteen days (four being Sundays or holidays not 
used) of the forty-five were given to the defense, and that those were 
cut short by the one idea of 

EXPEDITING THE TRIAL, 

that the service might not be inconvenienced, no matter how the ends 
of jiistice might be perverted, which seems to have actuated the Secre- 
tary of War, Avho issued a peremptory order to the court to sit without 
reference to hours. When Porter was required to enter on his defense 
not one of his important witnesses had been summoned or notified that he 
was to be a witness, although at the beginning of the trial Porter had 
been required by the judge-advocate to furnish a list of his witnesses — 
an unusual demand, the plea for making it being that the trial would be 
expedited and the service put to less inconvenience; and further, one 
witness. General Pope's chief of staff, held for the prosecution, was or- 
dered away from Washington so soon as it was found that he was to be 
a witness for the defense. Eminent statesmen, honored jurists, and law- 
yers as able and distinguished as are in our country have declared after a 
careful and ' ' patient study ' ' of the records of that court-martial that 

FITZ-JOHN PORTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED. 

Conscious of his innocence, and as preparation for an appeal, almost 
simultaneously with the publication of the sentence. Porter asked for 
the publication of the record by the Senate. His appeal was met by 
Senators presenting a volume, which had been surreptitiously published 
and hastily issued, which contained only the evidence for the prosecu- 
tion, not one word for the defense. And so 

SUCCESSFUL WAS THE DECEPTION 

in creating the impression that the whole evidence had been published, 
that the Senate denied the motion to print. 



Senator Fessenden said, holding the volume up to view: 

He was rather in favor of having the record printed and go to the country. 
But the record had been printed ; he had received a copy and read it. He be- 
lieved that tlie result arrived at was amply justified by the facts, and no other 
results could have been reached in any court. But the record was very volunii- 
novis; it would create a vast expense under the present circumstances, and as it 
was already printed he did not think it best to adopt the resolution. 

That volume, bound with other anonymously written and surrepti- 
tiously printed pamphlets of the prosecution, furnished to Senators, is 
now in existence. 

THE PRESS ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY FAVORABLE TO PORTER. 

The press of the country, that had carefully watched the proceedings 
of this court-martial, and which had all the evidence, almost unani- 
mously announced their opinion, a fair sample of which is an article in 
the New York Times January 12, 1862, from which I quote: 

It is very certain that the trials (General McDowell's and Porter's), although 
the impeachments of each officer were so grave, have not resulted in establish- 
ing any startling and terrible crimes to shock the country and disgrace the serv- 
ice. 

In the minority report of the committee of the Forty -sixth Congi-ess, 
page 29, ' 'the opinion of a careful military historian, the author of per- 
haps the best history of our civil war that has been written ' ' and writ- 
ten without ' ' prejudice or passion, ' ' is given, but if the members of the 
committee had turned to the appendix, pages 761-763 of the history by 
the Comte de Paris, from which the extract was taken, they would have 
found the amended opinion, and on page 292. of the later American 
edition they would have found all trace of it gone and commend atiort 
substituted ; and they no doubt would all have been as much astonished 
as was one of the minority when this appendix and the new addition, 
were shown to him, unfortunately not until after the report had been 
made. If the minority .still retain their exalted appreciation of this, 
author, then certainly when they find passages derogatory to Porter 
changed under new light to commendations, in justice they should give 
him the benefit of this high opinion. 

I give the exact words of the Comte de Paris (Appendix, page 761): 

We shall pass over in silence the charges of incapacity, cowardice, and trea- 
son. These are belied by Porter's whole career, w^io, both as a soldier and a 
chieftain, had been tried on more than one battletield, and whose devotion to 
the cause he served can not be called into question. * * * After his defeat 



< icncral Pope censured his lieutenant for not having prevented the junction of 
Jackson and Lonjcstrect by phicing himself between them on the Gainesville 
and Groveton road. He asserted that this maneuver was practicable and that 
it would have assured the defeat of the confederates. It was in consequence of 
this accusation that Porter was tried and condemned. At a later period when 
the facts became more fully known and the official reports of the confederate 
generals were given to the public it was shown that the junction of the two con- 
federate corps was effected long before Porter could have reached the point 
which had been indicated to him. 

******* 
General Pope has weakened the effectofthischarge by his immoderate course 
and by presenting the facts in a light which does not bear investigation. On 
the one hand he asserts that he ordered Porter to attack the enemy's right, and 
assumes that he willfully disobeyed him in not fulfilling his instructions. Now, 
this order, as we have already stated, was only dispatched at half past 4 o'clock, 
and Porter declared that he did not receive it until the moment when night 
rendered its execution impossible. The )novemeDts of the several corps had 
V>een so frequently countermanded that the officers of the general staff were 
unaljle to ascertain the exact position of each, so that tlie delay in the trans- 
mission of that order is not to be wondered at. On the other hand Pope, in his 
anxiety to prove that Porter's inaction ha<l permitted the enemy to concentrate 
all his forces upon that portion of his line which was defended by .Jackson, 
quotes the official report of the latter. But he made a mistake in the dates, as 
we have ascertained by e.\aiuining a collection of confederate reports on the 
campaigns of Vii'ginia, imblished in Richmond in 1864 (volume 2, page 96) ; the 
quotation he produces has reference to the 30th of August, and not the 29th. 
This explanation will suffice to show hoAv important it is to be circumspect in 
examining the various documents that have been published on both sides if one 
wishes to arrive at the exact truth. 

In the stress laid on the fact that Mr. Lincoln, then President, ap- 
proved the sentence of the court, it should be remembered that the 
proceedings of the court were never examined by him, and that he ap- 
proved the sentence mainly on the argument of the judge advocate, 
which misrepresented the evidence. Never was a great-hearted or great- 
minded executive more grossly betrayed by the servants in whom he 
trusted. Mr. Eobert Lincoln's testimony plainly shows that his father 
was misled by the Judge- Advocate-General's interpretation of I'orter's 
dispatch to Generals McDowell and King; nor should Governor New- 
ell's letter and testimony, showing that President Lincoln acknowledged 
to him that he believed himself misled and would be glad of an opportu- 
nity to reopen the case, be forgotten. 

It has been said that Porter should be judged on the 29th of August, 
1862, by what he knew of Longstreet to guide his acts; also, that Long- 
street was not in his front, and if so, that ht did not know it. In this 
coimection, I refer to Porter's letter of January 9, 1871, to the honorable 
Secretary of War, and to a dispatch of August 20, 18(5:?, from General 



73 

McDowell to General Pope, both accompanyiug this letter. It will 
there be seen that for the purpose of assuming a great success after a 
severe battle on the 29th that General Pope claimed in his dispatch 
from the battlefield that he had been fighting the combined forces of 
Longstreet and Jackson ; but in order to convict Porter, who acted on 
a positive knowledge of Longstreet's presence in his immediate front, 
General Pope testified in 1862 that Longstreet had not arrived up to a 
late hour in the evening and subsequently reported him coming on the 
field all that night and next day. 

Again, General McDowell testified in 18G2 that he knew nothing of 
Longstreet or of the cause of the falling back to Manassas of Ricketts 
and King, and that he did not meet them until after parting from Por- 
ter. Yet in part of that dispatch, written before seeing Porter, he says 
he had met King, had heard of Ricketts, and that they had fallen back, 
' ' being overmatched ' ' by Longstreet. The record of McDowell's court 
of inquiry, sitting in the same building with Porter's court, shows that 
he was proving that he knew all about Longstreet, and had arranged 
to prevent him coming through Thoroughfare Gap, only nine miles 
from Porter, on the morning of the 28th August. In 1878 he testified 
that he had imparted his information to Porter. 

ANIMUS. 

The charge that Porter exhibited ill-feeling toward General Pope is 
not sustained by the proof But we see scattered through the testimony 
•very strong evidence that General Pope entertained both jealousy and 
.animosity against Porter. 

In his first report of the battle of August 30, he said : 

The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon 
■retired in considerable confusion. 

Porter lost about 2,100 out of less than 8,500 men for the fighting 
that General Pope styles ' ' neither vigorous nor persistent. ' ' 

Other corps of General Pope's army lost from August 16 to Septem- 
ber 2, inclusive— Sigel 2,087 out of 9,000, Heintzelman 2,238 out of 
9,000, Reno 1,523 out of 7,000, McDowell 5,469 out of 18,000; and of 
these 5,469, more than 2,000 of McDowell's losses were reported as 
"missing," while Porter's "missing" was only 458. 

Jt will therefore be seen that in the fight that General Pope says 



wiis "neither vigorous nor persistent" Porter's loss in killed and 
■wounded on that afternoon was, in proportion to the strength of the 
various corps, 

NEARLY DOUBLE THAT OP ANY OTHER CORI'S 

during all the battles of the campaign, which lasted eighteen days. 

In describing the attack of General Porter, which General Pope says 
was neither vigorous nor persistent, StonewallJackson uses these words: 

In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary sirug 
gle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed 
forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us 
from our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to in- 
duce me to send to the commanding general for re-enforcements, but the timely 
and gallant advance of General Longstreeton the right relieved my troops from 
the pressure of overwhelming numbers, and gave to those brave men the chance.* 
of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal ad- 
vance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. 

The Schofield board, after describing Porter's conduct on this occa- 

.sion, comment upon it in these words: 

Thus did this gallant corps nobly and amply vindicate the character of their 
trusted chief and demonstrate to all the world that "disobedience of orders" 
and "misbehavior in the presence of the enemy" are crimes which could not 
possibly find place in the head or heart of him who thus commanded that corps. 

Porter'' s faithful, subordinate, and intelligent conduct that afternoon saved the Union 
army from the defeat which tvould otherwise have residted that day from the enemy's 
more speedy co7icentration. 

******* 

AVhoever else may have been respon.sible, it did not flow from any action or 
inaction of his. 

We believe not one among all the gallant soldierson thatbloody field was less 
deserving of such condemnation than he. 

Now, when we recall General Pope's testimony against Porter on his 
trial, contradicted as it was in many material points by an array of wit- 
nesses, many of them called by the prosecution, does it not appear that 
General Pope was possessed by some personal and malignant animus 
against Porter? 

On January 15, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Da\ve.s], by inter- 
posing objections, prevented the consideration of the bill for the relief 
of Fitz-John Porfer. He afterward obtained leave to address the House, 
and, by unanimous consent, I was granted the same privilege. His de- 
lay until this time made it necessary for me to proceed without a knowl- 
edge of the positions he would assume or the line of argument he would 



75 

pursue, and it was not until to-day that his views were presented to 
the House, so as to give me an opportunity to reply. 

It would seem, Mr. Speaker, that what I have already said has an- 
ticipated every material point in the speech of the learned and distin- 
guished gentleman. There were, however, a few assertions and insin- 
uations in his speech to which I will briefly allvide. He states: 

General Porter had, therefore, a trial according to the custom of war in like 
cases-a fair trial and by a court of the highest possible standing as to uitelh- 
gence, character, and integrity. 

It had not been my intention to discuss the legal features connected 
with the court, as I did not feel such a course was at all necessary to 
porter's vindication. 
It had been my impression that all persons who had examined the 
matter admitted the illegality of the proceedings under which he was 
tried; the matter of contention being tliat his conduct was so exem- 
plary that no honorable court could hesitate a moment, after hearing 
the evidence as now presented, to entirely exonerate him from any and 
all blame or censure. 

But as General Dawes has stated that Porter had a fair trial accord- 
ing to the customs of war in like cases, I will reply by asserting that 
the court, as constituted, was in violation of the sixty-fourth article of 
war and the sixty-fifth article as modified by act of Congress May 29, 
1830. It was also in violation of the seventy-fifth article of war, and 
if the statements of those who still assail General Porter are correct 
some of its members have disregarded the requirements of the sixty- 
uinth article of war, which, if true, would involve those gentlemen 
in the turpitude of disregarding the oath that is recited in said article.. 
I will first call attention to the sixty-fifth article of war, as modified. 

I read from the Army Regulations of August 10, 1861, page 495. The 
act referred to is an amendment to the sixty-fifth article of war: 

Whenever a general officer commanding an army, or a colonel commanding 
a separate department, shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any oflicer m the 
Army of the United States under his command, the general court-martial for 
the trial of such officer shall be appointed by the President of the United fetates. 

The proceedings and sentence of the said court shall be sent directly to the 
Secretary of War, to be by him laid before the President, for his confirmation 
or approval, or orders in the case. ,,,.,• 

So much of the sixty-fifth article of the first section of " An act for establishing 
rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States," passed 



^F 70 

•on the 10th of April, 1806, as is repugnant hereto, shall Ik?, and the same is hereby, 
repealed. (Act 29th May, 1830, sections 1, 2, 3.) 

Pope was a general officer, commanding an army, and Porter was an 
officer in the Army of the United States, under his command. 

It will therefore be observed that the act of Congress modifying the 
sixty-filth article of war directly applies to a case like this. 

General Pope and General Halleck could not be ignorant of these pro- 
visions, but is it not probable that they feared the inquirj- which would 
have come from President Lincoln had they asked him to order the court ? 
Did they not apprehend he would have hesitated before ordering a court 
to try the hero of Gaines's Mill, Cold Harbor, Chickahoniiny, Malvern 
Hill, and the brilliant victory of August 30 at second Manassas? Is it 
not possible that Lincoln was asked and either hesitated or refused to 
order the court ? 

Certainly these men would have made some effi)rt to procure a legal 
tribunal before resorting to violation of law in their effi)rts to crush a 
man whose reputation they sought to destroy. 

It is true that they give the face of the paper an appearance of legali- 
. ty, Pope's name not being signed to the charges. The signature reads: 

B. S. ROBERTS, 
Brigadier-General Volunteers and Inspector-General Pope's Army. 

When this point of illegality was suggested. Judge Holt said: 

There is no reference in the order appointing this court to General Pope at all. 
I wish to state distinctly that Major-General Pope is not the prosecutor in this 
case, nor has he preferred these charges, nor do I present them as being pre- 
ferred by him. 

It is true that General Pope swore before the court-martial that he 
was not the prosecutor, but his report of the battle of August 30 clearly 
showed that he was the animating cause of the prosecution; and when 
it became no longer necessary for him to fire from under cover, he ac- 
knowledged or rather boasted that he was Porter's accuser and prosecu- 
tor. 

In supplement to Senate Eeport No. 142, Thirty-eighth Congress, sec- 
ond session, volume 2, I find on page 190 extracts from a letter written 
by General Pope, which I will read. It Ls addressed: 

Hon. B. F. Wade, 

Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 



It says : 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th May,- 
1865. 

******* 

"Within two months it was actually found necessary to clepose General McCIel-- 
lan from his command, and bring Fitz-John Porter to trial. 

* ****** 

In the last days of January, 1863, when the trial of Fitz-John Porter had closed 
and when his guilt had been established I intimated to the President that it. 
seemed a proper time then for some public acknowledgment of my services in 

Virginia from him. 

* * * * * * * 

I considered it a duty I owed to the country to bring Fitz-John Porter to jus-- 
tice, lest at another time and with greater opportunities he might do that which- 
would be still more disastrous. 

With his conviction and punishment ended all official connection I have since • 
had with anything that related to the operations I conducted in Virginia. 

Although this is conclusive, it is only a part of the abundant evidence • 
that General Pope was both the accuser and prosecutor of Porter, and- 
as the court was appointed by General Halleck and not by the President, 
it was an illegal tribunal from the inception of its proceeding, and its- 
findings were void, even if all else had been legal. 

In discussing this feature of this article I quote O'Brien on Courts- 
martial, page 227: 

WHO MAY ORDER GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL. 

By the sixty-fifth article of war, any general commanding an army, orcolonel" 
commanding a separate department, may appoint general courts-martial when- 
ever necessary. 

But, by the act of 29th May, 1830, section 1, whenever said general or colonel- 
shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any officer in the Army of the United States, 
under his command, the general court-martial for the trial of such officer shall 
be appointed by the President of the United States. 

It is intended to prevent the packing of a court and still more, perhaps, to pre- 
vent the suspicion of such packing. 

The eflfect of this article is, first, when an army is assembled in a body, to pre- 
vent any other than its commander from ordering general courts-martial and to 
limit this privilege, even in such cases, to commanding officers having at least 
the rank of general. The secondeflt'ectof the article is, when a territory is divided 
into different departments, to confine the right of ordering general courts-mar- 
tial to the commanding officer of a department, and to grant this privilege to 
him only when he has, at least, the rank of colonel. 

With regard to the value this distinguished gentleman placed on him- 
self, in his conversation with Mr. Lincoln in January, 1863, 1 will sim- 
ply suggest that if he had only put himself on the New York Stock 
Exchange and bought himself for what Mr. Lincoln seemed to estimate 
his worth to the country and then sold himself for what he thought he 



^^ 78 

Avas worth it would have required but few deals for his wealth to have 

exceeded the colossal fortunes of Stewart, Vanderbilt, or Astor. I will 

now read the sixty-fourth article of war, from page 495, Army Regula- 

tious, of August 10,*1861: 

Art. 64. General courts-martial may consist of any number of commissioned 
officers from five to thirteen, inclusively ; but they shall not consist of less than 
thirteen when the number can be convened without manifest injury to the 
service. 

This article applies to all courts-martial and is intended when possi- 
ble to give an officer a full court even when tried for a most trivial 
offense. That being true, why should the law be disregarded in the 
trial of such a man as Porter upou charges involving life and honor? 
Washington city was at the time filled with high titled military men, 
and with all this aiTay could not Halleck and Pope find more than nine 
officers whom they could trust with their commission ? 

I do not mean to say that a court would be illegal composed of less 
than thirteen members, nor shall I discuss the question of what should 
be regarded as 

MANIFEST INJURY TO THE SERVICE. 

But I insist that the spirit and letter of the sixty-fourth article of war 
were grossly violated by ordering Major-General Porter to be tried in the 
city of Washington by a court consisting of nine members, with the thou- 
sands of officers of all grades in and about Washington; and it is im- 
possible to ascribe other than improper motives in providing for less 
than thirteen members of the court. 

ln\ Attorney-GeneraV s Opinions^ page2J)9, Mr. Attorney-General Wirt, 

in referring to this provision of the sixty-fourth article of war, after 

stating that it does not refer to convenience, nor is the injury alluded 

to only a probable one, but it must be a manifest injury to the service, 

uses these words: 

And if a smaller nwniber act without such manifest emerg-ency, T repeat "that 
they are not a lawful court and an execution under their sentence would be mur- 
der." 

I will now read the seventy-fifth article from page 497: 

Art. 75. No officer shall be tried but by a general court-martial ; nor by offi- 
cers of an inferior rank if it can be avoided. Nor shall any proceedings of trials 
be carried on excepting between the hour.sof 8in tlie niorningand Sin the after- 
noon, excepting in cases which, in the opinion of the officer appointing the court- 
martial, require immediate example. 



79 

Of the nine officers appointed hj the court-only two held commissions 
of the same gi"ade as Porter, all the balance being brigadier-generals. 
There were at this time more than thirty ofl&cers in the Army who were 
superior in rank to General Porter. Is it possible for any one to con- 
tend that the officers ordering the court eoiild not have avoided naming 
■eight officers of a grade lower than that held 1)y the accused ? Comment 
upon this matter is unnecessary. 

I will now allude to another action on the part of the prosecution, 
und remark that they may select that horn of the dilennna which best 
suits the purpose of their efibrt at justification. The seventy -fifth 
article of war provides that trials shall be carried on between the hours 
■of 8 a. m. and 3 p. ni., except in cases which 

REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXAMPLE. 

General Porter's friends have insisted for twenty years that one pur- 
pose of his immolation was, because the disasters of others required the 
punishment of some officer for an example. 

The proceedings of the court show that orders were given for its ses- 
sions to be held regardless of hours, so that either it was considered 
necessary to make an immediate example or this law was grossly violated 
lay the action of the official who issued the order. 

It is certainly not creditable to the Government that documentary 
evidence was 

WITHHELD 

or mislaid by General Porter's accusers. Some of this has not yet come 
to light, but other jiapers which prove essential facts, which were in- 
sisted upon by Porter at his trial, but denied by Pope and the prosecu- 
tion, were brought forward in 1878 by General McDowell, he having 
secretly withheld such papers since 1862. These papers were brought 
lorward by McDowell to prove a point to sustain his assertions as an 
accusing witness ; but the effect of said paj)ers was to sustain and con- 
firm other proof which General Porter had insisted upon and which dis- 
proved one of the strongest points insisted upon by the prosecution in 
1862. 

In the elaborate and well-arranged speech of the distinguished gen- 
tleman from Ohio [Mr. Dawes], he has apparently .selected every particle 
of alleged proof and every point which could be brought against this 
unfortunate soldier. 



^80 

Unlike, however, Geiienil Pope, he is not univereal in his condemna- 
tion. He says: 

I respect General Porter for liis valor on other fields, but for his failure on this- 
field I condemn him. 

His allusions to Porter's accusers do not show that his opinion of thos& 

gentlemen is very exalted. I will read: 

I have spoken not for General Pope. History must attend to his case ; it is not 
liere for trial. I have no concern as to the plots or machinations of General Irvin 
McDowell. I knoAv nothing of his personal schemes, plans, or purposes in that 
canijiaign. 

General Dawes also sustains General Porter and contradicts General 
Pope inmany points of evidence. The night of August 27, it will ber 
recollected, Pope testifies was starlight. General Daaves's recollection 
is verj' different. He saj's : 

I have no doubt that that night was dark ; nig:hts are apt to be when there is 
no moon. There is unimpeachable evidence that the night was dark. I find 
evidence that it was '■ very dark," given by my gallant leader who fell at Get- 
tysburgh. General John F. Reynolds. He testifies: 

■'It was a very dark night, as was the succeeding night. I recollect both of 
them distinctly from having been about a good deal until after 12 o'clock on each 
night." 

Ah, on the succeeding night I was about myself, and so was my honorable 
friend from Wisconsin. We can swear it was dark — very dark. 

General Dawes's recollection that this was a very dark night is also 

sustained by a number of other witnesses whose testimony I have cited to 

this House. He, however, commits a grave error when he makes this 

statement, which I will read: 

The sentence was approved by Abraham Lincoln, President of the United 
States. The Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, in his testimony upon the subject, says: 
"My father was exceedingly severe in his condemnation." 

Had he looked into the record of the Schofield board he would have 
found on pages 320 and 321 the evidence of Governor Newell, who tes- 
tifies that he had seen General Porter only twice, and that his per- 
sonal and political relations with President Lincoln were intimate and 
friendly and that he had a conversation with President Lincoln regard- 
ing Porter's case. In answer to a direct question from the court regard- 
ing Mr. Lincoln's statement on this occasion, Governor Newell said: 

Mr. Lincoln stated that he had not been able to give that personal attention to 
the cause which its merits required; that he had accepted the opinion of the 
Judge-Advocate-General and of the War Department as the basis of his action ; 
that if any evidence exculpatory of General Porter could be introduced he woukS 



81 

be very glad to give him an opportunity to have it presented : that he had a liigh 
regard for General Porter personally and as a soldier, and that he hoped that 
he would be able to vindicate himself in that way. I Iiad at least two conversa- 
tions with the President on tliatsu))ject, the import of which I have given you. 
I do not recollect the precise language, but it made a special impression upon 
my mind at the time, and my recollection has been fortified by a letter which I 
wrote to Governor Randolph, and which reminds me of this particularly. 

General Dawes and others of Porter's as.sailants make assertions re- 
garding General Garfield which I hope are eqwally erroneous. In their 
earnest eflforts to argne Avhat they seem to choose to regard as their side 
of the question they do not apparently reflect upon the great injury 
they were inflicting on tlie great and 

DISTINGUISHED DEAD. 

If it was true, as stated by some of General Porter's assailants, that 
information had been received by them regarding the opinion of any of 
the members of the court or any intimation as to how any member voted 
upon any of the charges or specifications, then it is also true that the 
member of the court who, they say, gave them information in the mat- 
ter was guilty of violating the oath which he took not to di^'ulge said 
facts. The letter alleged to have been written by General CJarfield I 
hope and trust was imposed upon the gentlemen by some enemy of our 
martyred President. I hope General Garfield's friends will cmwe to his 
rescue and prove, what I believe they will be able to prove, that this, 
like the Morey letter, was a forgery. 

I can not conceive that after reading Mr. Lincoln's views, to Avhich 
I have alluded, General Garfield would have used an expression to 
injure Porter and at the same time pervert the position of Mr. Lincoln. 
If he had in a thoughtless moment written such a letter or uttered 
careless expressions of the same character to confidential friends, he 
certainly had too much confidence in them to believe that his reputa- 
tion would be assailed by their publication to the world. 

My very high opinion of General Dawes convinces me that he was 
ignorant of this testimony regarding President Lincoln when he put on 
the first page of his speech the eight words taken from an expression of 
Hon. Robert T. Lincoln. These unexplained words standing alone do 
injustice to both the living and the dead. They misrepresent ilr. Lin- 
coln and make his distinguished son appear to attribute to him views 
WH G 



very ditterent iVom those expressed by hiiu when first informed of the 
wrong done to Porter. 

It seemed that Mr. Lincohi evinced a great pleasure in learning of 
Porter's ability to vindictite himself, also remarking that ' ' he had a very 
high regard for General Porter personally and as a soldier." 

Of (iourse the distinguished Secretary of War, in the phrase of eight 
words attrilnited to him by Mr. Dawes, referred to the ideas which his 
father derived from the review placed before him by Judge Holt. 

I feel confident, when my gallant friend, General Dawes, learns that 
his expressions did injustice to the magnanimitj'^ and love of justice of 
both PresidcHt Garfield and President Lincoln, that he will hasten to 
correct the error into which he has been led. 

General Dawes seems to be a gentleman whose mind was made up 

on this n\atter twenty years ago. His language on this floor is: 

As a soldier of the army of General Pope, and afterward in the Army of the 
Potomac, I tlien accepted this action of the court-martial as conclusive upon the 
subject. 

. Is it not probable that-this fact, together with his acknowledged ability, 

was the reason whj'^ he was selected to combat this cause against General 

Poller on this floor? General Dawes also says: 

That other generals under Pope in that campaign may have failed is quite 
probable. It was a general failure all around, so far as results are concerned. To 
assail other generals does not defend Porter. 

The intensity of Daaves's feelings he does not attempt to conceal. 

Because of the disastrous results of the campaign, he seems to think 

the immolation of some one is due to the country ; but in all his long 

speech I can not see that he gives any reason why Porter should be the 

one selected lor sacrifice. His own wishes on the subject are very tersely 

and forcibly expressed. I will read his exact words: 

From an old letter of my own, written from our camp near Belle Plain, April 
8, 1863, I take these words : 

" Shot to death by musketry for Fitz-John Porter would have been poor pen- 
ance for the thou.sands slaughtered at Bull Rvni, and we, their surviving com- 
rades and friends, would for their sakes rejoice at it." 

I respectfully submit to this House that in the trial of this cause a 
member who admits such prejudice should be strirck from the panel of 
jurors. We will not object to the use of his great ability as counsel 
again.st the accused; but I feel confident from my knowledge of his bet- 



83 



ter feelincrs he will of his own motion decline to stay with us in the 
donble capacity of judge and juror. But whatever may be his dispo- 
sition in this regard, the friends of justice will certainly appreciate his 
incapacity to give this case an impartial consideration. 

General Dawes's effort to prejudice the case by alluding to the time 
that has elapsed since the court-martial met in 1862 is a point hardly 
worth considering. The entire country knows that General Porter 
has been during all the time assiduous in his demands for a proper hear- 
in- of his case. The effort, to sustain a wrong by such a plea would 
meet with no fovor from the people. Another effort is made to detract 
from the dignity of the Schofield board, by assailing them with the 
statement that they "were without power U> compel the attendance of 
witnesses." This is an equally unfortunate allusion. The record 
shows that the only witnesses wanted by the Government or by Por- 
ter's accusers were easily procured, and it also shows that this want of 
power to compel the attendance of the witness was only made apparent 
by the court's strenuous efforts to bring General Pope before it to tes- 
tify. Pope's appeals to the Government to 

SAVE HIM FROM 

the severe examination and confusing inquiries to which he would have 
been subjected is now a matter of history. 

Vgain, General Dawes, wincing under the overwhelming proofs de- 
veloped by the Schotield board, as a last resort attempts to weaken its 
findings by speaking of its constitution as of questionable legality. 

This attack upon President Hayes would have come with better grace 
from some one else than the distinguished member from Ohio. The 
board was, in fact, in the nature of a court of inquiry, which is espe- 
cially provided for by the articles of war. Even if it should be said 
that a court of inquiry has no jurisdiction to report upon a citizen, it 
must be remembered that its report and inquiries were with regard to 
xnany gentlemen who still bore commissions in the Army. I have 
already considered what the evidence shows regarding the anhnus of 
the parties, but as General Dawes states that "the animusot Porter 
will be the controlling consideration in thedebate before the American 
people," let me ask what animus was in Porter's heart when he hurried 
fromthePeninsulatothesupportofPope,notevenwaitingforordersbut 



autiL-iiKitin;' them":' What was liis animus on Au^^ust oU, when by gal- 
lantry he siiyed Pope I'rom disastrous defeat? What animus was shown 
in his reply to a letter from (ieneral MeClellan which that otKcer wrote 
to him at the earue-st soliiitation of President Lincoln? The animus 
of Porter durinj" all this time is the same as that which he exhibited 
Irom June :i6 to the night of July 1, wlien 1)V his great gallantry and 
skill he won those 

VICTOR IKS 

to which earlier in these remarks I have alkulctl. 

Mr. Speaker, we accept this question of animus, and we inform (Ien- 
eral Pope and his Mends that they shall not retreat trom the position 
which they have taken. Let us consider Pope's aninuis and that of the 
Government officials in their treatment of Porter. What was the ani- 
mus iuducmg Pope to testify that he had nothing to do with the charges 
against Porter ? He knew that statement to be untrue, and has subse- 
quently- made statements that proved that it was not true. He also 
knew that if he admitted before the court that he was Porter's accuser 
he would have destroyed the legality of the proceedings. What animus 
was exhibited toward Porter by the Judge-Ad \ocate of the Army? 
He had prosecuted Porter before the court as judge-advocate. He then 
reviewed the proceedings of the court in the capacity of Judge-Advo- 
cate-General of the Army. 

When Porter completed his defense Judge Holt was invited by the 
court to reply, but he declined to do so; yet under an order of the Pres- 
ident he revised the proceedings in the caj)acity of Judge-Advocate- 
General of the Army, preiiaring a mo.st elaborate argument against Por- 
ter, in which he canvassed and reviewed the evidence; and this was 
the paper which was placed before President Lincohi. 

My fi'iend, Mr. Dawes, knows that this argument of the judge-ad- 
vocate of the court should have been made before that body so that 
General Porter could have had opportunity of replying thereto. One 
more jwint on animus. If Mr. Dawi:s will read the proceedings of the 
Porter case, page 489, he Avill find that during the trial Major-General 
William B. Franklin informed Porter that, if requested, General John 
F. Reynolds, General George H. Thomas, and himself would go before 
the court and swear that they would not believe either Pope or Roberts 
under oath. 



85 

Such evidence would have instantlj^ crushed the prosecution, and 
Porter knew it, but he declined to have these distinguished gentlemen 
testify, giving as a reason that it would give rise to bad feeliug. Could 
there, Mr. Speaker, be a more glaring case of animus than was ex- 
hibited by McDowell when he circulated what he represented to be a 
copy of Stonewall Jackson's report of the battle of the ^Bth, when in 
truth and in fact the report referred to the battle of the next day, in 
which Porter was so dLstinguished? What kind of animus was it, Mr. 
Speaker, which induced the ordering of an 

ILLEGAL COURT? 

Illegal because it was not ordered by the President as required by 
law; illegal because it was in violation of the articles of war. It con- 
tained but nine when it should have contained thirteen members. Ille- 
gal again, ]\[r. Speaker, because two of its members were not disinter- 
ested in the result of the trial. Illegal also, ]\Ir. Speaker, because one 
of these interested judges was placed upon the stand as a witness and 
resumed his place upon the bench as a juror and judge. 

But I am Avrong, Mr. Speaker, in detaining the House any longer in 
regard to the argument of the gentleman from Ohio. I hope upon 
further reflection that he will be led to do this wronged man justice. 

In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me say that I have never seen General 
Pope in my life, and my knowledge of General Porter is limited to the 
short time that he was my instructor in artillery at West Point. In 
common with all men who were thrown under his influence, I recog- 
nized in him those elements of which honorable and brave soldiers are 
constituted. During the last quarter of a century I have not met him 
but once, and that for a single moment, and in the presence of those 
who demanded his attention, so that he did not recognize me as one of 
his pupils at the Academy. I have no prejudice for Porter, nor do I 
desire to criticise his a.ssailant. Every word that I have said I feel is 
justified by evidence. I have not sought to vindicate Porter. My ob- 
ject in saying these words to the lovers of right throughout our land is 
to add my feeble mite toward the establishment of truth, the vindica- 
tion of honor, and the upholding of the sublime principles of justice. 



-Jgs 




^ 




